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INTRODUCTION

Scope andPurposeof Article
In its 1974 special session the North Carolina General Assembly

enacted an administrative procedure act.'

When the Act becomes ef-

fective on February 1, 1976, North Carolina for the first time will have
a comprehensive statute governing major parts of the procedures by
which most agencies of the State execute their functions. The Act also
sets out procedures that are to govern the relationship between the
agencies and citizens affected by agency action and the relationship
between agencies and the courts.2
As might be expected of comprehensive legislation, the Act will
raise a number of interpretive questions, some relatively minor, but
others quite significant. 8 The purpose of this article is to discuss some
of these questions.4

When interpretation will be aided, comparisons

will be made with other state administrative procedure provisions 5 or
1. In this article the statute will be referred to as the "North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act," the "NC APA," or "the Act," N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to
-64 (Supp. 1974).
2. Prior to the enactment of the NC APA several individual statutes had been enacted to govern aspects of administrative procedure in the State, some of which -the new
law repeals and others which it incorporates without substantial change. See text accompanying notes 16, 151, 187, 223, 228-29, 288, 291 infra. However the NC APA is
the first attempt in this State to bring together in one comprehensive statute many of
the significant general provisions governing administrative procedure.
3. It should be noted that the drafters of the Act and the General Statutes Commission worked under time constraints, and together with the Legislature, had to anticipate political constraints. Moreover, hindsight and detached reflection, none of which
were available prior to enactment, are likely to improve one's perception. Accordingly,
none of the comments herein should be taken as criticism of the efforts involved, nor
as impugning the Act. On the contrary, it is the author's judgment that the Act constitutes a substantial and important step in the right direction.
4. The provisions of NC APA governing publication will not be discussed in this
article. Article 5 of the NC APA contains publication provisions which in substance are
identical to provisions previously proposed but not enacted. These provisions are discussed by Professor Bell of Wake Forest University School of Law in Bell, Administrative Law: The Proposed North Carolina Statutes for Registration and Publication of
State Administrative Regulations,8 WAKE Fonnsr L. Rav. 309 (1972).
Moreover, since the NC APA addresses administrative procedure, as opposed to
"substantive" doctrines, this article will be limited to the scope of the statute. Several
administrative law substantive areas therefore will not be discussed, e.g., the delegation
doctrine and the separation of powers principle. Similarly, substantive agency functions
and powers are set forth in organic acts creating the agencies (or enabling legislation)
which will not be affected by the NC APA. Thus such acts will not be discussed.
5. A survey undertaken in connection with research for this article reveals that
about thirty states have adopted varying kinds of administrative procedure statutes. Provisions of other state administrative procedure acts are cited in various parts of this
article.
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cases interpreting them as well as the federal legislation in this area."
Finally, reference will be made to North Carolina laws and judicial
doctrines when this will help clarify understanding of the new statute.
B.

Importanceof AdministrativeAction

At the federal level, since the turn of the century, there has occurred a gradual rise in the activities and number of agencies. In the
thirties a rapid proliferation of federal administrative agencies took
place. 7 A similar pattern emerged in the states.8 The reasons for such a
trend generally have been attributed to the practical advantages of
agency action over all available alternatives, the trend toward preventive or remedial legislation, and the need for expeditious disposition
of a large volume of business, related to a similar or generalized subject matter.9
It may be asserted with confidence today that the action of administrative agencies so pervasively impinges on the daily lives of citizens and has become so thoroughly accepted as a mode of carrying
out government business that the phenomenon often goes largely unnoticed.' 0 The North CarolinaManual, which attempts a comprehensive listing of state agencies, boards, commissions, departments, and
bureaus-all broadly classifiable as administrative agencies-has over
one hundred entries."
6. The federal legislation is generally referred to as the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, although no longer codified in United States Code as a single unit. See
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-58, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970).
7. See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
FINAL REPORT 7-11 (1941) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 6-10 (1973).
8. See R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN TE STATE OF NEW YORK
9 (1942); 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1-7 (1965).
9. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-18. The compendium of
reasons for the rise of agencies in the cited reference was given with respect to federal
agencies. These reasons seem sufficiently related to the generally recognized unique advantages of agency action to be applicable to state agencies as well. Moreover, no basis
readily appears for distinguishing between federal and state agencies in terms of the nature and quality of the subject matter these agencies have been created to oversee.
10. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting over twenty years ago, in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952), stated that "[the rise of administrative bodies probably has
been the most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values are
today affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts . . . ." Similarly Professor Kenneth C. Davis, the renowned administrative law scholar, has stated that "the
administrative process affects nearly everyone in many ways nearly every day." K.
DAVIS, supra note 7, at 3.
11. NORTH CAROLINA SECRETARY OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 699-792
(1973). In popular parlance it is sometimes asserted that at least two things in human
experience are certain--death and taxes. Given the present pervasive character of their
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Background of the NC APA
North Carolina's administrative procedure act is the product of

an Administrative Procedure Drafting Committee, which began work
in 1970 under the aegis of the Revisor of Statutes of the Gen-,

eral Statutes Commission.1 2 The Committee began preparation of
a comprehensive administrative procedure act

3

that was submitted to

the General Statutes Commission which, in turn, recommended the
draft bill for enactment.' 4 The bill was introduced in the 1973 Session and was enacted in the 1974 Session on April 12, 1974.1-

The Act repeals Chapter 150 of the General Statutes which was
the Uniform Revocation of Licenses Act, and the "evidence," publication, and judicial review provisions.' 6
II.

A.

THRESHOLD CONSIDERATIONS

Overview of Administrative Procedure
Before proceeding to a discussion of the provisions of the NC

APA, a few basic concepts should be isolated. 17 The basic purpose of a

comprehensive administrative procedure act (APA) is to provide minimum uniform standards to govern administrative action. To be "comprehensive" an act must contain provisions governing administrative
adjudication, rulemaking, judicial review of agency action, and publication of administrative pronouncements.' 8 Under such procedural
acts the two unique types of agency functions are identified.
activities one might add administrative agencies. ee, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-203
to -210.17 (1965), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974) (embalmers and funeral directors);
id. § 105-269.2 (1972) (tax review board). See also 1 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at
7.
12. For a discussion of the Committee's formation, members and operations see
Bell, supra note 4, at 310-12.
13. Id. at 326 n.55.
14. General Statutes Comm'n, Docket No. 250/252 (1972).
15. Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1331, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 691 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Supp. 1974)).
16. Id., repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150-1 to -34, 143-195 to -198.1, 143-306 to
-316, 143-317 to -318 (1974).
17. The reader familiar with the lexicon of administrative law may not need this
review and may wish to proceed directly to Part II B infra.
18. These elements of comprehensiveness are developed from the statement of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of "major principles"
embraced by the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, first adopted by the conference in 1944. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 195 (1946) [hereinafter cited, e.g., as 1946 HANDnoOK]. The full
statement of the Commissioners was as follows:
(1) Requirement that each agency shall adopt essential procedural rules and
that, so far as practicable, all rulemaking, both procedural and substantive,
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Administrative agencies may take action which affects a particularly identified person who is a party to a proceeding before the
agency. 19 This function is generally characterized as quasi-judicial
and is generally defined in state acts as a "contested case. ' 20 When
this adjudicatory function is involved, statutory provisions and often
due process require adequate notice stating the grounds for the action, and require the holding of an evidentiary hearing prior to taking
the action. Often there may be restrictions on evidence which may
be relied upon, as well as a requirement that a record of the evidence be maintained. A party who will be affected by an adjudicatory decision must be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument at the hearing. The decisionmaker must rely only upon evidence adduced at the hearing in reaching a decision and must furnish
to all affected persons a written decision which states findings and
reasons for the decision.
As distinguished from adjudicatory (or quasi-judicial) functions,
an agency may take an action which affects a general group or class
of persons. The group may be composed of all persons engaged in a
particular activity-for example, all persons selling fertilizer, or using
pesticides or manufacturing a particular item. Agencies may affect the manner in which members of this class of persons carry on
their businesses. The agency would then issue a general pronouncement applicable to all persons in the group or class. A pronouncement
of general applicability is often referred to as a rule or regulation,21
although other terms, such as "standard" or "policy," may also be
used.
The agency process which results in a rule is characterized as
shall be accompanied by notice of hearing to interested persons;
(2) Assurance of proper publicity for administrative rules that affect the public;
(3) Provision for advance determination or "declaratory judgments" on the
validity of administrative rules, and provision for "declaratory rulings" affording advance determination of the application of administrative rules
to particular cases;
(4) Assurance of fundamental fairness in administrative hearings, particularly
in
regard to rules of evidence and the taking of official notice in quasijudicial
proceedings;
(5) Provision assuring personal familiarity on the part of the responsible deciding officers and agency heads with the evidence in quasi-judicial cases
decided by them;
(6) Assurance of proper scope of judicial review of administrative orders to
guarantee correction of administrative errors.

Id.
19. See text accompanying notes 171-73 infra.
20. Id.
21. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
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rulemaking. Quite often this process is classified as quasi-legisla22 With
tive, by analogy to the legislature's enactment of a statute.
participation in the rulemaking process by persons who will be affected by a proposed rule, the agency will be better informed and will
thereby be better able to discharge its legislatively assigned duties.
Rulemaking provisions thus require notice to persons likely to be
affected by a rule under consideration and an opportunity to be
heard. 23 When the agency has not issued a rule, persons may petition for adoption of one. Conversely, when the agency has adopted
a rule, persons may petition for its amendment or repeal.24
Formality in adjudication and rulemaking functions is limited for
the same reasons that prompted the creation of administrative agencies. The adjudication requirements preserve the essential safeguards
of fair procedure without unduly restraining agencies from acting expeditiously; yet all the rigors of court proceedings are not imposed.25
Administrative procedure acts universally recognize that emergency situations may require quick agency action. Thus emergency
rulemaking provisions permit agency action-to protect the public
health, safety or welfare-without observing general rulemaking requirements which would forestall quick action. Because of its summary nature, emergency rulemaking is an extraordinary proceeding.
Its use is circumscribed with requirements that emergency conditions
be specified and that 26a limit be placed on the period for which such
rules may be effective.
Since important rights may be adversely affected because of arbitrary, unlawful, discriminatory, or overly zealous agency conduct, procedure acts incorporate, in varying ways, the general principle of judicial review. Review is generally initiated by a petition to the court.
Since the functions of agency adjudication and rulemaking affect rights
in different ways, the scope of review is different. 28 The primary difference is that a more extensive review is provided for adjudication29
than for rulemaking.30
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

text
text
text
text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

98-140 infra.
148-70 infra.
202-09, 222-37 infra.
141-47 infra.
346-47 infra.
360-62 infra.
363-404 infra.
405-11 infra.
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It should be noted, however, that administrative agencies are vital and unique mechanisms for executing legislatively determined governmental business. Therefore courts must not usurp roles created for
agencies since agencies frequently possess skills and subject matter
experience courts do not have and judicial time should not be consumed second guessing agencies since this would result in both waste of
agency time and judicial inefficiency. But since agencies possess no
greater skills for interpreting constitutional and statutory requirements than do courts, it is generally considered that courts are free to
substitute their judgments for those of the agencies on such matters.
On factual questions, however, special agency skills may be involved.
Thus administrative procedure acts generally provide that courts may
reverse or modify agency decisions in limited circumstances.8 1
Publication provisions of administrative procedure acts have the
purpose of requiring agencies to inform citizens of agency determinations which may affect -them. In furtherance of this purpose such
acts provide various means for providing information to the public. All generally applicable rules on substantive matters and procedures for complying with requirements of statutes administered by
agencies are required to be filed in a central location. Often a state
official is required to arrange and compile agency rules and to pubfish them in a manner available to the public at large. 2
B.

BasicPrinciplesof the NC APA
(1)

General Purpose

The basic purpose of the NC APA, as stated in section 1(b), 83
is to establish, to the extent possible, uniform administrative procedures for agencies.3 4 However, this purpose is subject to two significant qualifications. The Act does not apply where any other "statute
makes specific provisions to the contrary." Secondly, the Act contains
a complete exemption of the Employment Security, Industrial, and
Utilities Commissions, and the Occupational Safety and Health Re31. See text accompanying notes 368-411 infra.
32. As noted, this article will not discuss the publication provisions of the NC
APA. See generally Bell, supra note 4.
33. "The purpose and intent of this Chapter shall be to establish as nearly as possible a uniform system of administrative procedure for State agencies." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150A-1(b) (Supp. 1974).
34. This purpose is similar to that which was first stated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws. See note 18 supra.
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view Board, and a partial exemption for the Department of Motor Ve-

hicles and the Department of Revenue 35 from the Act's rulemaking 6 and
3
adjudication provisions. "
No logical basis for the exemption of the Industrial and Utilities
Commissions is apparent. The exemption of the Employment Security Commission and the Occupational Health and Safety Review

Board might have been based on their extensive federal regulatory
relationship.

The partial exemption of the Departments of Revenue

and Motor Vehicles might have been influenced by the sheer volume of driver's and revenue licenses involved, as well as the limited
utility the required procedures would have in the vast majority of
cases. 8
The logic of the provisions respecting conflict with other statutes

seems clearly to avoid interpretive problems, but those provisions
may themselves raise problems; for example, determining the scope of

the "inapplicability" of the NC APA (i.e. the "extent" and "particulars"
in which another statute "makes specific provisions to the contrary" of
the Act). The wording of the "specific provision to the contrary"
clause, however, should be strictly construed, as it evinces a legislative purpose that the Act's inapplicability should exist only in narrow respects. 39

Uniformity, to the extent that the NC APA is applicable, is potentially limited in two other important respects. The rulemaking provisions establish minimum requirements-when other statutes establish additional requirements, such additional requirements continue to
exist over and above the NC APA.40 Moreover, the Act's judicial re35. This Chapter shall apply except to the extent and in the particulars that
any statute makes specific provi§ions to the contrary. The following are specifically exempted from the provisions of this Chapter: the Employment Security Commission; the Industrial Commission; the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Board; and the Utilities Commission. However, Articles 2 and
3 of this Chapter shall not apply to the Department of Motor Vehicles or the
Department of Revenue.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1(a) (Supp. 1974).
36. Id. §§ 150A-9 to -17. See text accompanying notes 69-170 infra.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-23 to -37 (Supp. 1974). See text accompanying
notes 171-286 infra.
38. Drivers licenses are issued or denied based upon a standardized test. Revocations are mandatory upon judicial adjudication that certain violations have been committed by the licensee. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-1 to -319.2 (1965). Revenue licenses are issued upon payment of the required fee that is statutorily prescribed. See
id. §§ 105-1 to -270 (1972).
39. In a few rare instances an entire agency function may be exempted from the
Act when it can be determined that an entire function is governed by a statute that
"makes specific provisions to the contrary."
40. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 150A-9 (Supp. 1974).
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when "adequate procedure" is
view provisions may be invoked 4only
1
not provided by some other statute.
(2)

The Definitional Coverage of the Act

The administrative bodies to which the Act applies are determined
by the definition of "agency." The NC APA contains a broad definition of "agency," 42 with specific exceptions by category, although no
attempt is made in the definition section to name individual agencies
excepted.4
An administrative body of the executive branch of state government, (however described-board, institution, commission, bureau,
department, council) is included in the definition of "agency." Excluded by the definition are four categories of bodies: (1) agencies
in the legislative or judicial branches of state government, (2) the political subdivisions of the State (cities, towns, counties) or agencies
to statethereof, (3) other bodies that are local in nature (as opposed
44
act.
legislative
by
created
corporations
wide), and (4) private
41. Id. § 150A-43. See text accompanying notes 294-306 infra.
42. State APA's evidence three basic approaches to definitional applicability:
(1) Broad definitions, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.640(a) (4) (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Apuz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(1) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANm. § 120.52(1)
(Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 263 (Smith-Hurd 1967); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(a) (1971).
(2) Broad definitions, with specific exceptions of listed bodies, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 3A-102 (Supp. 1974); MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 244 (Supp. 1973); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 3.560(103) (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.2(a) (Supp.
1974).
(3) No general definition but the statute contains a list of agencies covered, e.g.,
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 11500(a) (West 1966); Owio Rnv. CODE § 119.01 (Page
Supp. 1973).
43. "Agency" means every agency, institution, board, commission, bureau, department, division, council, member of Council of State, or officer of the State
government of the State of North Carolina but does not include those agencies
in the. legislative or judicial branches of the State government; and does not
include counties, cities, towns, villages, other municipal corporations or political
subdivisions of the State or any agencies of such subdivisions, or county or city
boards of education, other local public districts, units or bodies of any kind,
or private corporations created by act of the General Assembly.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Supp. 1974).
44. The exclusions of agencies in the legislative or judicial branches, municipal corporations and political subdivisions are easy enough to work with. See generally Board
of Trustees v. Webb, 155 N.C. 379, 71 S.E. 520 (1911); McCormac v. Commissioners
of Robeson, 90 N.C. 452, 456 (1884).
The express exclusion of county or city boards of education but the failure to exclude boards of trustees of the state colleges or universities raises the question whether
boards of trustees fall within any of the exclusions. It seems clear that colleges and
universities come within the terms "agency, institution, board, bureau, department...
of the State government." Similarly they are not "in" the legislative or judicial branches
of the State government. Are they "other municipal corporations or political subdivi-
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(3)

The Functions Governed by the Act

In a particular case, if it is determined that an administrative
body is not exempted from the Act and is included in the Act's definition of "agency," the Act governs any agency functions in the areas
covered. Stated generally, the Act's functional applicability is triggered if a covered administrative body engages in the making of
"rules" or the determining of "contested cases," as these terms are defined. 4 When a covered function is involved, reference must be made
to the particular procedures applicable to the function in question.
Licensing has been given special recognition in the Act.40 Given
sions of the state?" The terms "municipal corporations" and "political subdivisions"
have been interpreted to mean quasi-public corporations for governmental purposes created out of a subdivision of the state's territory. Board of Trustees v. Webb, supra.
They have been seen as related to power to act within a geographic district, such as
counties, townships, school districts and road districts. McCormac v. Commissioners of
Robeson, supra. Arguably these terms are so related to geographic divisions that they
would not include state entities that are not geographically limited. Are the universities
"other local public districts, units or bodies of any kind?" Under the 1971 legislation
which consolidated the several state colleges and universities into the "University of
North Carolina," there is created the "Board of Governors of the University of North
Carolina," as a governing body with statewide jurisdiction. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1161, -3 (Supp. 1974). On different facts but in a similar context, the North Carolina Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between statewide and local bodies in defining
"agency." Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 470, 202 S.E.2d
129, 137 (1974) (interpreting the term "agency" as applying only to an agency of "statewide jurisdiction," although the provision contained no exclusion of local bodies as the
NC APA does).
Accordingly, since the consolidation law gave the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina statewide jurisdiction of higher education in North Carolina,
it appears that the Board of Governors is not covered by the exclusion of local bodies
from the definition of "agency."
The final exclusion of "private corporations created by the Act of the General Assembly" would not seem to include the University of North Carolina because by definition the University is not a "private corporation" but is a "body politic." N.C. Gm.
STAT. § 116-3 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
It should be noted that In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964), held
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306 (1974) (repealed by NC APA) applicable to an individual
university; but that statute did not contain the "local bodies" exclusion contained in section 2(1) of NC APA.
45. The Act contains two definitions of "rule"-one for purposes of the rulemaking
provision, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-10 (Supp. 1974), and a slightly different one for
purposes of the publication and registration provisions, id. § 150A-58. 'The definition
of "contested case" determines the action which generally must be preceded by a hearing,
id. § 150A-23, and, in general, action that is subject to judicial review, id. § 150A-43.
Although the Act contains special provisions when the function of "licensing" is
involved, licensing is itself included in the definition of contested case and thus would
be covered under the Act in any event. Id. § 150A-2(2).
46. The Act contains two relevant definitions: "'License' means any certificate,
permit or other evidence, by whatever name called, of a right or privilege to engage in
a trade, occupation, or other activity, except licenses issued under Chapter 20 and Subchapter I or Chapter 105 of the General Statutes." Id. § 150A-2(3). "'Licensing'
means any administrative action issuing, failing to issue, suspending or revoking a li-
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the inclusion of the licensing function within the definition of "contested case," thus bringing it within the procedural protections applicable to the adjudicatory function, 47 the reasons for according additional treatment to licensing are unclear. Several practical reasons
might be advanced. The Revised Model State APA, which has influenced the formulation of many state APA's, contains special provisions
on licensing.48 In addition special attention to licensing is perhaps
warranted because of the sheer number of licensing agencies, 40 as
cense." Id. § 150A-2(4).
It should be noted that consistently with the partial exemption from the Act of the
Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department of Revenue, licenses issued in connection with motor vehicles, id.H9 20-1 to -319.2 (1965), and for revenue purposes, id.
H9 105-1 to -270 (1972), are excluded from the definition of license.
47. See text accompanying note 276 infra.
48. REVISED MODEL STATE APA, § 14 (1970 version). The Model State APA
originally promulgated by the Commissioners did not contain special licensing provisions. See 1946 HiANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 191-217. These were added by the Commissioners in the 1961 revisions with the comment that "in view of the widespread importance of the subject in state affairs, it would seem desirable to take notice of certain
other facets of the matter." 1961 id. at 220.
49. Prior to the adoption of the NC APA, chapter 150 of the General Statutes contained the Uniform Revocation of Licenses Act. Section 9 of the Licenses Act listed
the following licensing boards which will now fall within the NC APA:
Board of Architecture, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83-8 (1965);
Board of Barber Examiners, id. § 86-11;
Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners, id. § 93-12(5);
Board of Chiropody Examiners, id. §§ 90-191, -192;
Board of Chiropractic Examiners, id. §§ 90-143, -145;
Board of Contractors, id. § 87-10;
Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners, id. § 88-17;
Board of Dental Examiners, id. § 90-29 (Supp. 1974);
Board of Electrical Contractors, id. § 87-42;
Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors, id. § 87-42 (1965);
Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, id. § 90-210;
Board of Registration for Engineers and Land Surveyors, id. § 89-7;
Board of Nursing, id. § 90-168;
Board of Examiners for Nursing Home Administrators, id. § 90-278 (Supp. 1974);
Board of Opticians, id. § 90-240 (1965);
Board of Examiners in Optometry, id. § 90-118 (Supp. 1974);
Board of Osteopathic Examiners and Registration, id. § 90-131 (1965);
Pesticide Board, id. § 143-442 (1974);
Board of Examiners of Plumbing and Heating Contractors, id. § 87-21 (Supp.
1974);
Examining Committee of Physical Therapists, id. § 90-260;
Board of Examiners of Practicing Psychologists, id. § 90-270.11;
Real Estate Licensing Board, id. § 93A-3 (1965);
Board of Refrigeration Examiners, id. § 87-57;
Veterinary Medical Board, id. § 90-183;
Water Treatment Facility Operators Board of Certification, id. § 90A-24 (Supp.
1974);
Wastewater Treatment Plant Operators Board of Certification, id. § 90A-38 (1965).
In addition, an examination of other statutory provisions has disclosed the following
state departments or agencies involved in the licensing function which are not solely for
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well as the fact that occupational licensing directly affects a person's

licensing immediately
ability to earn a livelihoode and "regulatory"
51
safety.
or
welfare
health,
public
affects the
C. The Necessity for Balancing CompetingConsiderations
One overriding interpretive norm seems applicable to all ques-

tions which might arise under the Act: a balancing of the desirable,
but often competing, considerations which affect administrative action.
The reasons for creating administrative agencies include efficiency,

speed, volume, flexibility and informality. Weighed against these are
fairness considerations-equitable treatment of persons in like circum-

stances, notice, opportunity to participate, regularized process, articulated reasons for agency action and overall "rationality" in agency
process. The inherent clash of such objectives can only be minimized
by careful balancing in particular instances. The balancing must
also weigh the interests affected by agency action, the press of volume,
the need for expeditious agency action and the number and costs of
revenue generating purposes:
Commissioner of Agriculture, id. §§ 106-50.4, -65.14, -168.4, -277.18 (1966);
Child Day-Care License Board, id. § 110-88 (Supp. 1974);
Board of Conservation and Development, id. §§ 113-152, -154 to -156 (1966);
Department of Conservation and Development, id. § 113-114;
Board of Education, id. § 115-153 (Supp. 1974);
Commissioner of Game and Inland Fisheries, id. § 113-91 (1966);
Department of Human Resources, id. § 130-176 (1974);
Commissioner of Insurance, id. §§ 58-40, 85A-2 (1965);
Board of Landscape Architects, id. § 89A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Board of Law Examiners, id. § 84-24 (1965);
Board of Commissioners of Navigation and Pilotage of Cape Fear River, id. § 763;
Board of Commissioners of Navigation and Pilotage of Old Topsail Inlet, id. § 7628;
Structural Pest Control Committee, id. § 106-65.27 (1966).
50. This occurs in two ways: (1) The administration of criteria and qualifications
for initial entry into a profession or occupation. See, e.g., id. § 58-41.1 (Supp. 1974)
(insurance agent or adjuster); id. §§ 76-3, -28 (1965) (pilots); id. § 83-8 (Supp. 1974)
(architects); id. § 84-24 (attorneys); id. § 86-3 to -5 (1965) (barbers); id. § 87-10
(Supp. 1974) (contractors); id. U§ 89-7(b) to -8 (1965) (engineers and surveyors); id.
§ 110-91 (Supp. 1974) (day care centers); (2) The administration of professional standards of conduct or practice for continuedprofessional or occupational qualification. See,
e.g., id. § 76-3 (1965) (pilots); id. § 83-9 (architects); id. § 84-28 (Supp. 1974) (attorneys); id. § 87-11, -13 (1965) (contractors); id. § 89-9 (engineers and surveyors); id.
§ 110-91 (Supp. 1974) (day care centers).
51. Through the licensing function general regulatory controls may be established
for activities that affect the public health, safety or welfare; e.g., id. §H 130-171 to
-176 (1974) (licensing bedding manufacturers to insure sanitation); id. §§ 143-215.105
to .114 (permits to control sources of water pollution); id. §§ 72-46 to -49 (1965) (permits, after inspection, to regulate sanitation of eating and food preparation establishments).
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providing staff personnel.
While maximum efficiency might call for autocratic, procedureless action, such "efficiency" in a society of laws is manifestly out of
place. Citizens must be prepared to pay the costs, sacrifice the speed,
suffer the formality and tolerate the inefficiency-which in the aggregate may be substantial-inherent in an attempt to insure a greater
degree of fairness. The NC APA explicitly recognizes these principles.6 2
In determining the applicability of the NC APA to agency action,
the Act properly avoids a need to determine whether the action is "formal" or "informal." But in delineating the scope of its applicability,
problems are encountered that have a conceptual similarity to those
presented in classifying agency action as formal or informal. Thus a
brief discussion of the classification problem may be helpful. As will
be seen, a balancing process is involved.
Strictly speaking, all administrative action (other than perhaps
purely ministerial nondiscretionary functions) may be classified as
"formal" or "informal. 5 8 The classification dichotomy traditionally
has carried with it fundamental consequences. 5 4 Professor Kenneth
52. Id. § 150A-1 (b) (Supp. 1974) requires a uniform system of administrative procedure "as nearly as possible." Rules promulgated under the Act must be adopted "in
substantial compliance"--not literal compliance-with the rulemaking provisions. Id. §
150A-9. The adjudication provisions employ terms such as opportunity for hearing
without "undue delay" and "reasonable" notice of a hearing. Id. H9 150A-23(a), (b).
The judicial review section authorizes a court order compelling action when "unreasonable delay" on the part of the agency is found. Id. § 150A-44.
53. This, of course, is a substantial oversimplification, but seems analytically
sound. Cf. Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Dunn U. 51 ("all administrative decision-making involving the formulation of policy is divided into three parts: informal
action, rulemaking, and formal adjudication"). Since it would appear that rulemaking,
for most purposes, can be divided into formal and informal rulemaking, see Verkuil, ludicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. Rav. 185 (1974), separating out rulemaking does not seem necessary for purposes of this discussion.
54. The dichotomy originates, in large measure, from the Federal APA. See
Clagett, supra note 53, at 52 n.3, generally defining the term "informal" as "those
formulations of agency policy which are subject neither to the notice and public-participation requirements of sections 553(b) and (e) [of the Federal APA, 5 U.S.C. H9 553
(b)-() (1970)] nor to the requirements of a formal adjudication [required to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing by 1d. § 554(a)]."
However, analysis under the Federal APA of the distinction between "formal" and
"informal" action resolves into something like an Alice-in-Wonderland situation anyway:
formal adjudication is agency action which, under the Federal APA, is "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," id. § 554
(a), and formal rulemaking is agency action which, again under Federal APA, is required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. Id.
§§ 553(c), 556-57. This all works fine when some other statute requires a "record"
and a "hearing," but as can be seen, the Federal APA lends scant guidance to a determination of the administrative decision-making model applicable in the absence of such
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Culp Davis, one of the eminent scholars of administrative law, argues
most persuasively that eighty to ninety percent of all administrative
action is "informal" in the sense that it is neither accompanied by a
hearing nor subject to judicial review." The largest amount of attention in the administrative law field has been given to the ten percent of formal administrative action mostly in attempts to perfect oral
hearing procedures 0 or to formulate boundaries between formal rulemaking and adjudication procedures.5"
It is doubtful that a formal mode of procedure for all administrative action would ever be advocated (even if one excluded purely ministerial administrative funotions). The reasons are not difficult to see.
The capacity of agencies to render judgments (whether in a rulemaking or adjudication context) utilizing an informal decisionmaking
model is one of their unique capacities. A degree of informality may be
essential if agencies are to accomplish the missions assigned to them
with flexibility and expedition. Also state agencies characteristically
are smaller than federal agencies, "8 both in agency officers and in
staff,59 which has fairly obvious implications for the extent to which
such agencies can be expected to formalize procedures.
Accordingly, the impulse to include an increasingly larger portion
of agency action within the coverage of the Act by labeling such action
"formal," and thus subjecting it to the rigors of all the requirements of
the NC APA, must be resisted. As will be discussed more fully, 60 the
requirements founded upon other statutes, or when the other statutes require a hearing,
but no record.
55. K. DAvIs, supra note 7, at 516. The statement was made primarily in connection with federal agencies. It seems equally applicable to state agencies, if not more
SO.

56. Id.
57. Clagett, supra note 53, at 53. Mr. Clagett suggests that one way to deal with
the vast ninety percent of administrative action that is informal-at least at the federal
level-is to restrict the realm of such action by bringing more of it within the ambit
of either formal rulemaking or adjudication-and thus presumably according such previously informal action the full panoply of procedural rigors applicable to formal action.
Speaking generally and in a traditional sense, this would include a requirement of
a participation opportunity by parties (perhaps with an oral "hearing"), the making of
a transcript or other verbatim record, some restriction on the type of "evidence" which
may be relied upon, a decision with articulated reasons in written form, and the availability of judicial review. But see Verkuil, supra note 53, at 230-44.
58. State agencies may have part-time commissioners, smaller geographic jurisdiction, limited assistance from staff and the like. 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 3-5.
59. This is not intended to imply that all state agencies are smaller than all federal
agencies. Indeed some state agencies are quite substantial. For example, the North
Carolina State Highway Commission employs over 10,000 persons, and the Board of
Health over 600.
60. See text accompanying notes 69-79 and 171-87 infra.
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Act's broad formulations could be read literally to extend formal procedural requirements to all agency aotion 1 (other than perhaps purely
ministerial, nondiscretionary functions).60 Such a reading would be
counterproductive and unwise.6 3 The Act should be interpreted to accomplish its essential purposes rather than to insure literal compliance.
These purposes are assurance of fundamental fairness by the agency
to persons whose interests are affected, 64 reasoned decisions and actions,"s and creation of an adequate basis to permit the courts to ascertain the propriety of the decision or action. 0 Such purposes 7 are
applicable to formal as well as "informal-looking" action where any
exercise of discretion is involved. Accordingly, a quest for a rigid or
fixed dividing line between the supposed discrete realms of formal and
informal action need not be undertaken. In interpreting the NC APA
the most productive inquiry to determine its applicability to particular
agency functions is to ask where the best balance can be struck between the essential purposes of the Act on the one hand and the practical
61. E.g., N.C. GENi. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Supp. 1974) defines "contested case" as
"any agency proceeding, by whatever name called, wherein the legal rights, duties or
privileges of specific parties are to be determined." As to contested cases sections 2136 prescribe procedures applicable.
Similarly, section 10, with exceptions, defines "rule" to include each "regulation,
standard or statement of general applicability that implements or prescribes law or policy
.
... See id. §§ 150A-9, -11 to -17.
62. While empirical study would be necessary to determine the precise effects such
an interpretation might have, it may be reasonable to assume that many state agencies
could not comply with the full procedural rigors of the NC APA in the vast bulk of
their actions, because of lack of sufficient personnel or because present personnel would,
without further training, lack the technical and legal skills necessary in many instances.
To equip agencies for such full compliance would likely prove prohibitively expensive.
See also R. BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 13-15.
63. The added time and money costs to taxpayers of requiring such procedures
likely could not be justified where either the risk or substantial procedural error is slight
or the adverse effect on an interest by a procedural error is likely to be insubstantial
or harmless.
64. This requires notice of procedures available, and of agency action contemplated
a reasonable time in advance of the action to permit a response by one affected and
fair evaluation of the response, if any.
65. This requires that a deciding officer be familiar with the evidence, that any
decision be based upon a sufficient quantum of probative evidence, that evidence or factual matter to be relied upon be available for scrutiny by an affected party, that decisions
rendered be unaffected by bias or prejudice, and that decisions be within statutory purposes and powers.
66. This requires that a decision reveal the facts it relies upon, the conclusions derived from the facts and the legal basis upon which the decision rests.
67. See generally F. BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 36-44; 1961 HANDBoo, supra note
18, at 204. The foregoing statement of purposes is intended only briefly to summarize
categories of basic considerations and not to constitute an exhaustive compendium of the
detailed aspects of administrative procedure which might touch upon the purposes. To
do so would, of course, require a multi-volume treatise. See 1-4 K. DAvis, ADmINISIRATrvE LAw TREATisE (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis, TREAT7sE].
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reasons calling for agency action and flexibility on the other.6"
I.

A.

RULEMAKING:

THE LEGISLATIVE ANALOGY

Characteristicsof the Rulemaking Function
An agency's promulgation of a rule (i.e. rulemaking) is in many

respects analogous to the legislature's enactment of a statute.69 However, no single general description can encompass all the facets of this
function.70 Moreover, in its various permutations rulemaking shades
almost indistinguishably into agency adjudication.7 1 One helpful definition of "rulemaking" is "the issuance of regulations or the making
of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and

unspecified persons or situations ....
This definition will be relevant for a number of purposes. It
may become necessary to distinguish between a rulemaking decisional
model and an adjudicatory model to determine the procedures applicable within the agency, the mode of seeking judicial review, and, in
some instances, the applicable scope of review. 7

Also it is necessary to

classify rules according to type as "procedural," "interpretive," or "legislative."7 "

The type of rule so described may be a relevant consider-

ation in determining the extent to which a deviation from the precise
provisions of the Act can be permissible and in applying to specific
68. In its initial implementation, administrative agencies will be called upon to
comply with the provisions of the Act. In many instances they will have the advice and
guidance of the Office of the Attorney General. But even so, numerous interpretive issues will arise as to specific provisions. The best agencies can do is make a good faith
interpretation, guided by considerations such as those outlined. The state supreme court,
of course, will have the final word on interpretation. It is to be hoped that the court's
interpretation will reflect such basic considerations as well in cases when they arise.
69. See generally 1 DAvis, TRFATISE, supra note 67, § 5.01.
70. See generally Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L.
Rav.259 (1938).
71. Rulemaking, though of general applicability, may in fact involve only one or
two parties, who, for example, are engaged in the activity being regulated. In this instance rulemaking can begin to look very much like adjudication.
72. Fuchs, supra note 70, at 265. See also 1 DAvis, TREATisE, supra note 67, §
5.01, at 286-87.
73. See text accompanying notes 152-54, 171-74, and 315-21 infra.
74. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 173-76. "Procedural" rules might conceptually
be seen as not constituting a distinct category of rules, but as either "legislative' or "interpretive" depending upon whether the rules are promulgated with a statutory grant of
rulemaking power ("legislative") or whether they purport merely to "explain" statutory
requirements ("interpretive"). 1 DAvis, TREATiSE, supra note 67, § 5.03, at 299-300.
Moreover, it is necessary to separate out procedural rules because the NC APA contains
special requirements governing rulemaking and rules involving agency procedures. See
text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
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facts such terms as "substantial compliance!' 5 and "best calculated. 76
Moreover, it should be noted that, depending upon the factual
context in which rulemaking occurs, differences in procedural requirements or the meaning of terms may be reasonable. Such factual
contexts can be grouped as follows: (1) the character of the parties affected; (2) the nature of the problems to be dealt with; (3) the
character of the administrative determination; (4) the types of administrative agencies exercising the rulemaking function; and (5) the
71
character of enforcement which attaches to the resulting regulations.
With these general considerations in view, we turn now to the
specific provisions of the NC APA. For purposes of the rulemaking provisions, the Act defines "rule" as any "agency regulation, standard or
statement of general applicability that implements or prescribes law
or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency," including the "amendment or repeal of a prior
rule," and lists six exclusions.7 8 Thus an administrative pronouncement which sets forth law or policy or sets out the manner of operation of an agency or the manner in which persons may appear before
the agency is encompassed within the definition of "rule." Since this
definition standing alone is sufficiently broad as to encompass the vast
bulk of pronouncements by agencies, the significant interpretive questions are likely to involve the six exclusions.
The first exclusion contains two parts: (1) statements concerning only "internal management" of the agency which (2) do not affect private rights or procedures available to the public. 0 Accordingly, a statement regarding internal management and subject matter
not excluded from the term "rule" is covered under the Act.80 Similarly, an internal management statement which affects private rights
or the procedures available to the public is within the term "rule,"
notwithstanding its concern with internal management.81
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 (Supp. 1974).
76. Id. § 150A-12(c).
77. Fuchs, supra note 70, at 266-73.
78. See notes 79-87 and accompanying text infra.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-10(1) (Supp. 1974).
80. Perhaps if an "internal management" statement can be severed from other included subjects, it would appear that the exclusion would apply to the severed internal
management part, thus leaving only the other included subject covered by the rulemaking
provisions.
81. Internal management has been given a practical interpretation under the Federal APA. It has been held that a post office rule requiring that all categories of overseas mail be routed by the most expeditious air service without regard to type of aircraft
used did not fall within the internal management exclusion, notwithstanding that it was
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The second exclusion concerns "declaratory rulings'" issued under section 17 of the Act and is discussed below. 2 The third exclusion
is intra-agency memoranda, except those "to agency staff which implement or prescribe law or policy. '83 Statements of policy or interpretations 'that are made in the decision of a contested case are cov-

ered by the fourth exclusion. 84 The fifth exclusion is rules "concerning use or creation of public roads or facilities which are communicated to the public by use of signs or symbols. 8 5
The exclusion of "interpretive rules" and "general statements of
policy" from the definition of "rule' '86 is likely to raise significant
questions. In developing the parameters of the interpretive-rule exclusion, it may be useful to consider the other classifications, mentioned above, into which rules may be placed, i.e. procedural and legislative.8 7
(1)

Procedural Rules

Generally speaking, agency procedural rules are those pronouncements that relate to how the agency executes the functions charged to
it and to the steps persons must take in dealing with the agency.8 8 The

NC APA sets out in section 11 special additional requirements for procedural rules.8 9 It requires that agencies adopt rules of practice setdirected to employees, because it substantially affected interests of parties outside the
agency. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Gronouski, 230 F. Supp. 44 (D3).C. 1964).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10(2) (Supp. 1974). See text accompanying notes
155-70 infra.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10(3) (Supp. 1974).
84. Id. § 150A-10(4). However, it would appear that if the agency, based on the
result in a contested case, desired to promulgate a general rule to govern a matter in
the future based on a given set of facts, the promulgation would constitute a rule subject
to rulemaking requirements unless within another exclusion.
85. Id. § 150A-10(5). This exclusion would not appear to be troublesome because
it is limited to actions of agencies which are communicated to the public by "signs or
symbols."
86. Id. § 150A-10(6).
87. See E. GELLHORN, ADMiNmSTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 122-27
(1972).
88. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 173-74.
89. Special requirements.-In addition to other rulemaking requirements
imposed by law, each agency shall:
(1) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of
all formal and informal procedures available, including a description
of all forms and instructions used by the agency.
(2) Make available for public inspection all rules and all other written
statements of policy or interpretations formulated, adopted, or used
by the agency in the discharge of its functions.
(3) With respect to all final orders, decisions, and opinions made after
July 1, 1975, make available for public inspection together with all
materials that were before the deciding officers at the time the final
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ting forth all procedures available (including a description of forms
used) and make available for public inspection all rules or other
written matter pertaining to how the agency conducts its business. 0°
(2)

Legislative Rules

Many statutes invest the agency created with a power "to issue
rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this act."0' 1 For an
agency to promulgate legislative rules, such a statutory rulemaking
power or, at least, a statutory inference that a rule or regulation may
have authoritative force, is necessary. 92 Legislative rules fill the interstices of statutes. They go beyond mere interpretation of statutory
language or application of such language and within statutory limits
order, decision, or opinion was made, except materials properly for
good cause held confidential.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-11 (Supp. 1974).
90. For example, a statement of how hearings may be sought (even if the hearing
itself would be part of a contested cause) would involve procedures available to aggrieved persons. Accordingly, an agency's formulation or statement of procedures for
seeking a contested case hearing would constitute a rule and thus be subject to the rulemaking provisions. See, e.g., 1 F. CooPER, yupra note 8, at 173 n.1, 174 n.3; I DAvis,
T"ATisE,

supranote 67, § 5.03, at 299.

91. A survey of the general statutes has shown that agencies with rulemaking
powers can be separated into two broad classifications: (1) those with generally described rulemaking powers and (2) those with rulemaking powers relating to specific
subjects. Agencies with general powers include:
Board of Agriculture, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-139(a) (1966);
Commission for the Blind, id. § 143B-157 (1974);
Department of Natural and Economic Resources, id. § 113-8 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Commissioner of Insurance, id. § 143-146 (1974);
John H. Kerr Reservoir Committee, id. § 143B-328 (Supp. 1974);
Commissioner of Labor, id. § 110-18 (1966);
Structural Pest Control Committee, id. § 106-65.29 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Commission for Health Services, id. § 143B-142 (1974);
Board of Pensions, id. § 112-8 (1966);
Pesticide Board, id. § 143-437 (1974);
Ports Authority, id. § 143-218(11);
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, id. § 137-32.1;
Agency for Surplus Property, id. § 143-64.2(b);
Wildlife Resources Commission, 1d. § 113-81.7(2) (1966).
Rulemaking authority with respect to specific matter is granted to the agencies
enumerated below (although this does not preclude the existence of a general rulemaking
power):
Board of Agriculture, id.§ 106-50.15 (1966);
Advisory Budget Commission, id.§ § 143-53 (1)-(11) (1974);
Building Code Council, id.§§ 143-138, -146(c)-(d);
Board of Education, id. §§ 115-11, 115A-5 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Department of Natural and Economic Resources, id. § 113-391 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
Ports Authority, id. § 143-224(c) (1974);
Social Services Commission, id.§ 143B-153.
92. 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 175-76.
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set down additional substantive requirements.
(3)

3

Interpretive Rules

Generally speaking, interpretive rules carry no sanction, and if

a sanction is involved, it is seen as emanating from the statute. 94 In-

terpretive rules and general policy statements of agencies are excluded
from the rulemaking provisions," while procedural rules and substantive legislative rules are not excluded, unless falling within one of the

other exclusions of the Act.

6

In determining the rulemaking require-

ments applicable to particular rules, courts are not limited to the la-

bel placed on the rule by the agency, but will look instead to the substance of the rule in question. 9 7 It should be emphasized that careful scrutiny of the substance of the rule in question is critical, since the

interpretive-rule exclusion, if not confined to proper boundaries, could
well subsume the rulemaking provisions.
B.

Promulgation of Rules

Assuming an administrative pronouncement constitutes a rule and
does not fall within one of the exclusions of section 10, the rulemaking
procedures are applicable. With respect to such covered rides two distinguishing procedural norms are recognizable: general rulemaking
(in circumstances other than an emergency) to which the basic requirements of the Act apply; and emergency rulemaking which permits disregard of several requirements normally applicable.
93. See R. BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 294.

94. See generally Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23
AD. L. REv. 101, 108-13 (1971).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10(6) (Supp. 1974).
96. See id. §§ 150A-10(1)-(5).
97. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972) (Secretary's action suspending "Precertification List" exempting aliens engaged in certain occupations from requirement of showing job offer at time of entrance visa application was
subject to rulemaking requirement of the Federal APA, notwithstanding agency label
placing the action in category excluded from rulemaking requirements since the action
changed existing rights and obligations); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F.
Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970) (regulations that had substantial impact on regulated industries were not within interpretive rule exclusion of the Federal APA); accord, Gibson
Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952); cf. American President Lines, Ltd.
v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Commission rule interpreting requirements of Shipping Act not subject to judicial review under the Federal
APA since Commission rule had no binding effect but was essentially opinion of the
legal staff).
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Non-Emergency Rulemaking-The Basic Procedural Norm

As previously noted, the Act provides that, with the exception of
emergency rulemaking, no rule adopted after the effective date of the
Act' s shall be valid unless adopted in "substantial compliance" with

the rulemaking requirements. 0

The basic procedural requirements

for rulemaking are designed to assure that agencies adopt essential

procedural rules and, so far as practicable, that all rulemaking, both
procedural and substantive, be accompanied by notice of hearing and
an opportunity for interested persons to present information for the
agency's consideration. 10° These basic requirements are contained in
section 12.101
98. The Act becomes effective on February 1, 1976. Law of April 12, 1974, ch.
1331, § 54.4, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 691, 703.
99. linimum procedural requirements.-It is the intent of this Article to
establish basic minimum procedural requirements for the adoption, amendment,
or repeal of administrative rules. Except for emergency rules which are provided for'in G.S. 150A-13, the provisions of this Article are applicable to the
exercise of any rule-making authority conferred by any statute, but nothing in
this Article repeals or diminishes additional requirements imposed by law or
any summary power granted by law to the State or any agency thereof. No
rule hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with
this Article.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 (Supp. 1974).
100. This statement of basic procedural requirements is a modified version of the
statement made by the Commissioners in connection with the Model State APA, 1946
HmADBOOK,

supra note 18, at 200.

101. Procedure for adoption of rules.-(a) Before the adoption, amendment
or repeal of a rule, an agency shall give notice of a public hearing and offer
any person an opportunity to present data, views, and arguments. The notice
shall be given within the time prescribed by any applicable statute, or if none
then at least 10 days before the public hearing and at least 20 days before the
adoption, amendment, or repeal of the rule. The notice shall include:
(1) A reference to the statutory authority under which the action is proposed.
(2) The time and place of the public hearing and a statement of the manner in which data, views, and arguments may be submitted to the
agency either at the hearing or at other times by any person.
(3) A statement of the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved, and the proposed
effective date of the rule.
(b) The agency shall transmit copies of the notice to the Attorney General and all persons who have requested the agency in writing for advance
notice of proposed action which may affect them. The notices shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by mail or otherwise to the last address specified
by the person.
(c) The agency shall publish the notice as prescribed in any applicable
statute or, if none, shall publish the notice in a manner selected by the agency
as best calculated to give notice to persons likely to be affected by the proposed
rule. Methods that may be employed by the agency, depending upon the circumstances, include publication of the notice in one or more newspapers of
general circulation or, when appropriate, in trade, industry, governmental or
professional publications. If the persons likely to be affected by the proposed
rule are unorganized or diffuse in character and location, then the agency shall
publish the notice as a display advertisement in at least three newspapers of
general circulation in different parts of the State.
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(a) Notice of proposed rulemaking-adoption,amendment,
or repeal of a rule
In order for an opportunity to participate in rulemaking to be effective, there must, of course, be adequate notice to the persons who
would participate. One primary aspect of adequacy is the time between notice and the hearing. The NC APA requires that notice be
given at least ten days before the hearing and at least twenty days
before the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, unless another
statute specifies a different notice period. 102
A second aspect of the adequacy of notice is whether the persons
receiving it are informed of the substance and effect of the rule proposed so that an assessment of the rule's impact on their interests and
an informed decision about a formal presentation can be made.
The NC APA confronts this problem by requiring that the notice
refer to the statutory authority under which the rulemaking is proposed, state the time, place and manner in which a presentation may
be made to the agency, and contain a statement of the terms or substance of the proposed rule or the subjects or issues involved. 03 The
NC APA follows the Model Act's notice theory rather than state statutes
which always require a full text or informative summary of the proposed rule. 1 4 Nevertheless it would appear that in most instances
the agency should set forth the full text (or tentative text) of the proposed rule under consideration if the proposed rule is not so lengthy
that including the text in the notice would be unduly expensive. However, when undue expense would make textual inclusion unwise or the
text of the proposed rule is technical (or for some other reason would
not be informative) the agency should include a concise but informative summary. 0 5
(d) The public hearing shall comply with any applicable statute but is not
subject to the provisions of this Chapter governing contested cases, unless a
rule is required by law to be adopted pursuant to adjudicatory procedures.
(e) The agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule. Upon adoption of a rule, the agency, if requested
to do so by an interested person either prior to adoption or within 30 days
thereafter, shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and
against its adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12 (Supp. 1974). On the general question of rulemaking procedure see E. GELLHORN, supra note 87, at 127-31. For broader treatment see 1 DAvis,
TREATISE, supra note 67, at §§ 6.01-.04.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(a) (Supp. 1974).

103. Id.
104. See 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 188-89.
105. It has been held that inadequacy of the notice of proposed rulemaking invali-
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The third aspect of notice adequacy is the method and scope of
dissemination. Section 12 provides that "any person" must be given
an opportunity to present data, views, and arguments. While it might
be argued that some kind of universal notice should be given, since
there is unlimited opportunity to make a presentation before the
agency, practically speaking only persons who are significantly affected
are likely to undergo the expense or devote the time required to make a
presentation.
Moreover, the statute specifies that the notice be disseminated in
three ways. First, copies of the notice are to be sent to the Attorney
General.' 06 Second, persons who have requested notice must be given
direct written notice by mail (or other appropriate means) in advance of the action proposed and within the applicable time limit.' 0 7
Third, with respect to the general public, the agency is required to
give notice by publication as required by statute, or if no statute specifies a publication method, in a manner "best calculated" to give
notice to persons "likely to be affected by the proposed rule."' 08
Here the exercise of informed judgment by the agency is required to
select the method by which actual notice to such persons is likely to
occur. This is evidenced by the last sentence of section 12(c) which
provides that "[i]f the persons likely to be affected by the proposed
rule are unorganized or diffuse in character and location, then the
agency shall publish the notice as a display advertisement in at least
three newspapers of general circulation in different parts of the
State.'1 09
(b)

The rulemaking hearing

The NC APA provides that a rulemaking hearing, when required,
shall comply with any applicable statute and that the requirements
dates a subsequently adopted rule. State v. Squally, 474 P.2d. 897 (Wash. 1970) (en
bane) (notice of proposed rulemaking affecting Puget Sound could not be considered
adequate description of subjects involved to permit a rule prohibiting fishing in rivers
emptying into the Sound).
106. Presumably the notice will then be available for public inspection in the Attorney General's office, and moreover that this office can be checked for all notices of
rulemaking since this provision effectively designates the Attorney General's office as
central depository or registry for notices of proposed rulemaking. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150A-62 (Supp. 1974).
107. Id. § 150A-12(b).
108. Id. § 150A-12(c).
109. Id. A "display advertisement" is an advertisement which is not part of the
"classified" ads that appear in newspapers but, generally, is one set off in a box by lines.
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governing contested cases do not apply." 0 The agency must hold a
"public hearing" and offer "an opportunity to present data, views and
arguments." 1 1 This requirement taken with the usual connotation
of the term "public hearing" raises the question whether all rulemaking
hearings must be conducted orally with any affected persons being
permitted to make an oral presentation, or alternatively, whether
"data, views and arguments" may be in the form of written submissions. Other related issues are also suggested: may persons have presentations made in their behalf by attorneys (or other :representatives); is the agency required to make any sort of record of the hearing (verbatim transcript or other); may data, views and arguments
be addressed to facts or be in the nature of legal arguments; and are
persons making presentations to be sworn in some fashion?
Generally speaking, the purpose of an administrative hearing is
to allow persons who would be affected by a proposed rule to present
relevant factors for the agency's consideration in order to inform the
agency of the effect of a proposed rule."12 Unless the Act commands
a particular type of hearing, an agency proceeding which satisfies
the basic purposes of the hearing requirement ought not to be condemned because of form alone." 3
Permissible "hearing" forms might include a spectrum from trialtype procedures to informal consultation with affected parties."' The
requirement that "an agency shall give notice of a public hearing and
offer any person an opportunity to present data, views, and arguments' 5 could be literally interpreted as permitting only the most
formal procedures or at a minimum, a hearing which included oral
10
speechmaking.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(d) (Supp. 1974).
111. Id. § 150A-12(a).
112. See, e.g., Bell, Administrative Law: Rule Making and a "Hearing." A Tale of
Two Cases (Three Rules) or What the Dickens!, 8 GA. L. Rnv. 19, 63 (1973).
113. See text accompanying notes 103-05 supra;notes 128-38 infra.
114. Professor Davis, for example, has made the following observations: "rules
may be formulated through any one or more of the following methods: no participation
by the parties affected, consultations and conferences between the agency and the
parties, consultation with advisory committees representing parties, written briefs or
presentation of written data, speech-making hearings, and trial-type hearings." 1 DAvis,
TREATISE, supra note 67, § 6.01, at 360.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2A (Supp. 1974).
116. See 1 DAvis, TREATISE, supra note 67, § 7.01. It can be argued that whenever
the term "hearing" is used in a statute, it means at least an oral speechmaking procedure,
on the grounds that the term can have no other meaning. However, if the term can
have any non-oral meaning, the task in interpreting a statute is not what the term intrinsically means for most situations, but what the legislature intended the term to mean
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Reference to other language of the Act provides the unmistakable inference that trial-type hearings are not required. Several practical considerations intimate that the legislature could not have intended to require trial-type hearings in every instance of rulemaking.
Section 12(d) provides that the rulemaking hearing is not subject to
the provisions governing contested cases that require a trial-type hearing.117 Accordingly, it can be concluded that the most formal procedures are not always required. This is not to say, however, that such
procedures may not be appropriate in some instances. One such instance is when disputed issues of fact are involved in a rulemaking pro8
ceeding."
Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that section 12(a)(2) provides that the notice of hearing shall contain "[a] statement of the
manner in which data, views, and arguments may be submitted to the
Section 12
agency either at the hearing or at other times . . . ."1
(e) provides that "[t]he agency shall consider fully all written and
oral submissions . ...*..0 These provisions mean that at least in
addition to a speechmaking hearing, written submissions may be
permitted in a rulemaking context (before, at, or after a hearing).
It can be argued that the term "hearing" read in light of the purposes of the rulemaking requirement is not necessarily limited to its
traditional connotation that implies oral speechmaking.' "2 Whether oral
in the instance at hand. When there is no direct or empirical evidence of the legislature's intent (which is the case with the NC APA), the question becomes what must
the legislature have intended the term to mean, in light of the purposes the legislature
was attempting to accomplish.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(d) (Supp. 1974).
118. See DAvis, TREATISE, supra note 67, § 6.01.
Any or all of the methods of party participation may be used for the formulation of one set of rules: an original draft may be prepared through consultation of the agency's staff with an advisory committee, then questionnaires or
invitations for written comments may be sent to affected parties with or without submission of a tentative draft of the rules, then the tentative rules as modified may be discussed at a speechmaking type of hearing, and finally disputed
issues of fact that emerge may be isolatedfor a trial-type hearing.
Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(a) (2) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
120. Id. § 150A-12(e) (emphasis added).
121. For a concise traditional definition of the term "hearing" see BLACK'S LAW
DicTIoNARY 852 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). However, it should be noted that the purpose for
a definition may well have direct bearing on the definition questions. Compare Morgan
v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), with Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933). See also 1 DAvis, TREATIsE, supra note 67, § 7.01, at 407
("A 'hearing' is any oral proceeding before a tribunal.") (emphasis added); id. § 7.07,
at 433 ("The meaning of the term 'hearing,' when a trial is not intended [by the legislature], is often unclear. Probably an opportunity to submit written evidence or argument without an oral process is not within the term."). But see note 116 supra.
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hearings are always required cannot be answered definitively by refer-

ence to the terms of the Act. The Federal APA provides that "[tihe
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation. ' 122 Similarly the Revised Model State APA generally provides for "reasonable opportunity
to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing!'12' but adds a
special requirement if "substantive" rules' 2 4 are involved-an oral

hearing if requested by twenty-five persons, by a governmental subdivision or agency, or by an association having not less than twenty-five
members.' 2 Several states that require oral hearings in certain instances provide for dispensing with oral rulemaking procedures in certain situations. 20
Against these precedents of statutory specificity the silence of the
NC APA is troublesome. Nevertheless, for the reasons hereinafter dis-

cussed, it is doubtful that the legislature intended to require oral hearings in every instance of rulemaking. Accordingly, the better interpretation of the Act would be to construe "hearing" in a rulemaking
context to permit agencies to limit the participation opportunity in ap27
propriate instances to written presentations.1
122. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
123. REVISED MODEL STATE APA § 3(a)(2) (1970 version); 1961 HNDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 209-10.
124. Substantive in the context involved would generally mean "legislative" rules,
as distinguished from "procedural" or "interpretive" rules.
125. 1961 HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 209-10. This requirement is inflexible and
seems arbitrary. A less arbitrary provision is contained in the Montana APA which
requires an oral hearing if requested by 10% of the persons who will be affected by
a proposed rule. MONT. Rnv. CODES ANN. § 82-4204 (Supp. 1974). The interpretation urged herein would make the NC APA preferable to the Model Act and the Montana APA, because it would permit an agency to tailor the hearing to fit the circumstances of each case. Suppose there exist only twenty persons who would be directly
affected by a proposed rule. Under the Model APA an oral proceeding apparently could
never be required. Suppose, on the other hand, that there are 10,000 persons who would
be directly affected. Under the Montana APA 1,000 persons must request an oral hearing. Assuming they did, imagine 1,000 speechesl Moreover, the oral proceeding provisions of the Model and Montana APA's are not specifically related to hearing purposes.
Under the NC APA, as urged herein, an agency faced with factual disputes in a rulemaking context could permit oral proceedings, without being forced to do so based on
the arbitrary number of persons who requested oral proceedings, if hearing purposes
would not be furthered thereby.
126. E.g., CoLo. RPv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-103(4) (1973) (oral hearing required unless agency deems such procedure unnecessary); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 3
(2) (1973) (oral proceeding may be eliminated if it is unnecessary or impracticable).
127. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 53, at 245. If the Act should not be interpreted as
urged, the legislature should amend it to permit agencies to dispense with oral proceeding in rulemaking contexts, in appropriate instances, as discussed textually below. In
connection with the interpretation urged, given the language of the Act, an oral proceed-
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The vast bulk of state APA's, particularly those patterned after
the Revised Model State APA, and the Federal APA permit agencies
to receive written submissions in lieu of oral hearings in rulemaking,
unless otherwise required by law.'28 The NC APA contains no general provision to this effect, but has a narrow, limited provision in the
case of rulemaking in emergencies. 2
Moreover, the NC APA's requirement of a "hearing" applies to
all rules subject to the basic rulemaking provisions of the Act. An oral
hearing could tie up an agency's staff for substantial periods listening
to speeches. This possibility might cause agencies to underutilize
rulemaking notwithstanding its advantages, or to adopt evasive devices
to fit rules into exceptions. Burdening agencies with form, therefore,
could be inimical to the broader public interest.
Noncontroversial matters will not generate a need for any kind of
hearing (or other participation by the public); yet, if oral procedures
are always required, the agency must go through the motions of setting
a hearing date, time and place, and designating someone to preside
over the speechmaking; but no one may appear. In contrast, if only
written submissions are permitted, a place and cutoff date for filing
written submissions can be established without an undue burden on
agency personnel.
Moreover, an oral hearing in all situations may not be the best
mode of either effective participation by the public or enlightened decisionmaking by the agency. The late Professor Cooper has noted that:
More significant than the statutory right to present views at
a formal hearing are the opportunities which may be afforded interested persons to engage in informal consultations with agency
representatives before the rule is adopted. Even in cases where
the statute does not require, and the agency does not voluntarily
solicit, public participation in rule-making procedures, the members of an agency staff engaged in drafting the rule will almost
always be found willing to receive the suggestions of interested persons as to the formulation of the rule, and to discuss informally
the problems involved.
ing might well be treated as a presumption which may be rebutted by cogent agency
reasons.
128. A survey undertaken in preparation of this article revealed only Michigan as
having an absolute "hearing" requirement, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(141) (Supp.
1974), in substance identical to the NC APA. Many other states have adopted the
Model APA formulation, or specify instances in which oral hearings are required.
129. For a discussion of emergency rulemaking see text accompanying notes 14147 infra.
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Such informal consultation may afford the most effective
method for participation in rule-making proceedings. If one can
discuss the problems involved with the draftsmen within the
agency's staff who will write the proposed rule that the heads of
the agency will consider, it is often possible to obtain a more intimate insight into the agency's views than is available in more formal public hearings.
In such discussions, furthermore, representatives of private
parties are afforded an unparalleled opportunity to suggest methods
whereby the agency's purposes can be achieved with least dislocation of business practices. Staff members can point out administrative objections to the proposals urged by private parties. Frequently, an area of mutually satisfactory compromise can be discovered.
A device that can be employed most effectively in many instances is that of an unofficial advisory committee. Such committees have the function of working out technically acceptable solutions to problems complicated both by administrative difficulties
and by 30emotional clashes between competing special interest
groups.1
Assuming that oral hearings should not always be required, it becomes very difficult to provide anything more than a general statement
that the agency should have flexibility to exercise discretion to formulate a rulemaking procedural mode best suited to the purpose at
hand. 13 1 Factors that should be considered in making this determination include: the nature of the rule proposed, -the possible number of
parties it would affect, the nature of the interests of the parties, and
the nature of the question or issues involved.1"' If -the rule involves
a broad policy question, written presentations may be quite adequate.133
If an unduly large number of persons could be expected to appear at
an oral hearing thus making it laborious and time-consuming perhaps
again written procedures would be appropriate. 3 4 On the other hand,
if the rule proposed involves factual issues, oral proceedings (perhaps
even in an adversarial format) would be preferable if not necessary.13 5
Both oral or written participation opportunities have their limita130. 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 198 (footnote omitted).
131. Cf. E. GELLHORN, supra note 87, at 131.
132. R. BENJAMN, supra note 8, at 301-02.
133. Cf.E. GELLHORN, supra note 87, at 128-29.
134. See, e.g., 1 F. CooPin, supra note 8, at 194; 1 DAvis, TREAnThm, supra note

,67, § 6.02.
135. In this connection, Professor Gellhorn notes that such issues as the "who,
what, where, when and how questions" may well be best tested in trial-type proceedings.
E. GELLHORN, supra note 87, at 139.
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tions. Writteh submissions can be skimmed over or disregarded.180
Agency personnel can impassively listen at hearings and then forget all
that has been said. 187 In an attempt to forestall such eventualities the
NC APA requires that an agency "consider fully all written and oral
submissions," and upon adoption of a rule, if requested by an interested person, "issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for
and against its adoption" including reasons for overruling considerations urged against adoption.' 38
If an oral rulemaking hearing is held, the agency should have broad
discretion to set reasonable limits on the number of persons who may
appear, the record to be made of the hearing, as well as the subjects to

be covered at the hearing. In addition when parties desire presence
of counsel, there is no evident policy that should preclude such legal
assistance. 3 9 The making of a "record" of a rulemaking proceeding
should not be required, at least not in the sense of a hearing-on-therecord when "formal" rulemaking occurs under the Federal APA.140
However, some method should be employed by the agency through
which oral presentations are preserved and written submissions are
compiled by agency personnel so that, if requested, the agency can issue
the statement required by section 12(e). Oath administration would
not seem mandatory except when full-blown trial-type procedures are
being utilized.

(2) Rulemaking in Emergencies
One trade-off when considering procedural regularity is maximum efficiency and speed.

Ordinarily such reduced efficiency and

136. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 194. "Such submissions are too easily
skimmed over without careful study, or handed to staff assistants for their consideration,
or even (it may be feared) sometimes disregarded." Id.
-137. See Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 CoLuM. L.
Rnv. 589 (1941).
Let it not be assumed too easily that hearings are a significant protection
against bureaucratic absolutism. To a slothful administrator a hearing precedent to regulation may be a God-given opportunity to avoid work and thought.
He need only listen with impassively judicial countenance and then forget all
he has heard. It is the conference with its give and take of ideas and information, with its possibilities of detailed exploration of minor points and hidden
comers which stirs the mind to action. Moreover, there are demonstrably situations where hearings produce little if anything of value.
Id. at 596.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-12(e) (Supp. 1974).
139. For example, Ohio specifies that an agency permit a person to appear in person
or by an attorney. Oruo REv. CoDE ANN. § 119.03(c) (Page 1969).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). See also Bell, supra note 112, at 46.
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speed are acceptable from a public policy viewpoint. However, certain
situations may make delay unacceptable. 14 ' Expeditious action is often
necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare. 142 In recognition of this situation, section 13 of the NC APA provides that upon finding that "imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare" requires
rulemaking without the basic procedures specified in section 12, an
agency may proceed "without prior notice or hearing" or upon such
abbreviated notice and hearing as is practicable. 4 An emergency
rule may be effective for a period of 120 days.
Emergency rulemaking is an extraordinary proceeding. Accordingly, its use is substantially circumscribed. As a condition to proceeding under :the emergency rulemaking mode, the agency must find
and set forth its findings in writing that a specified peril to the public
health, safety or welfare requires dispensing with the basic procedures
outlined in section 12.
If an agency does not initiate proceedings under section 12, it may
not reissue or readopt the same or a substantially identical rule based
upon the circumstances found in connection with the original emergency. The section 12 provision respecting the adoption of an identical rule clearly implies that an emergency rule based on a particularfact
situation may be promulgated for only one 120 day period. Relying
on somewhat different language, but a substantively similar formulation
of the Wisconsin APA, 1 44 the Wisconsin Attorney General issued an
opinion that an emergency rule could not be perpetuated by simply refiling it before or after the 120 day period provided by the Wisconsin
45
Act.'
Assuming notice of emergency rulemaking is not accorded in advance, notice must be given after-the-fact. In most circumstances the
nature of the rule will require communication to persons required -to
do or refrain from doing an act for the regulation to accomplish its intended purpose. If this is not the case, however, an attempt to impose
a sanction for violation of an emergency rule, or any other rule for
141. See generally 1 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 200.
142. It has been suggested that a state's power to take temporary action to meet conditions that imperil the public health, safety or welfare historically derives from the
exercise of the police power to abate nuisances. See generally Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1972).

143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-13 (Supp. 1974).

This provision, in substance, is
1961 HANDBOOK, supra

identical to REVISED MODEL STATE APA § 3(b) (1970 version).

note 18, at 210.
144. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.027 (1957).

145. 1973 Wis. ArT'Y GEN. OP. (Dec. 19, 1973).
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that matter, would appear to raise a substantial due process issue,
if the person had not received at least constructive notice through publication, unless the person, through some other means, had received actual notice. 146 Raising the constitutional issue is likely to be unnecessary, however, since generally a rule not published under an APA
requiring publication is invalid.147
C. Adoption by Reference, Rule Continuation,and
Petitionsfor Adoption
(1) Adoption by Reference
An agency dealing with a subject upon which there has been promulgated, for example, a national code may wish to adopt such a code
without publishing the code itself. This process, if pursued, would constitute an adoption by reference, and is permitted by section 14.148
This North Carolina provision is relatively unique among APA's, with
research disclosing only Michigan with a similar provision.14
It is clear that the adoption-by-reference provision is not intended to permit dispensing with either the prior notice requirement
(including a statement of the terms or substance of the proposed rule)
or the procedural opportunity to participate through the submission
of data, views, and arguments required by section 12. For example,
the intent to adopt some standardized code by reference would seem
to be a matter upon which views might be submitted in the course of
a rulemaking proceeding.
(2)

Continuation of Rules

Section 15 appears to be addressed to problems created by governmental reorganizations. 5 0 It provides for two instances in which
146. Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
147. 1 DAvis, TREATSE, supranote 67, § 6.10, at 398; id. § 6.11, at 404.
148. Adoption by reference.-An agency may adopt, by reference in its
rules and without publishing the adopted matter in full, all or any part of a
code, standard or regulation which has been adopted by an agency of this State
or of the United States or by a generally recognized organization or association. The reference shall fully identify the adopted matter by date and otherwise. The reference shall not cover any later amendments and editions of the
adopted matter, but if the agency wishes to incorporate them in its rule, it shall
amend the rule or promulgate a new rule therefor. The agency shall have
available copies of the adopted matter for inspection and the rules shall state
where copies of the adopted matter can be obtained and any charge therefor
as of the time the rule is adopted.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1SOA-14 (Supp. 1974).
149. Micr. COMP. LAWS § 3.560(132) (4) (Supp. 1974).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-15 (Supp. 1974).
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previously effective rules have a continuing validity, without the necessity of complying with the basic rulemaking procedures. First, when
a law under which an agency is empowered to promulgate rules is repealed and "substantially the same rulemaking power" is vested in the
same or a successor agency by a new provision of law, a previously promulgated rule has a continuing validity. Second, when the function
of an agency that has promulgated rules is transferred to another
agency, the existing rules of the original agency that relate to the transferred function remain in effect. In both of these instances a rule remains in effect until amended or repealed by the transferee agency. 151
The other instance addressed by section 15 is one in which a law
creating an agency or authorizing the promulgation of rules is repealed
or the agency is abolished and "substantially the same rulemaking
power" or duty is not vested in a continuing agency by a new provision
of law. In this instance rules of the abolished agency are automatically
repealed as of the effective date of -the repeal of the law authorizing
the promulgation of rules or the abolition of the agency.
(3) Petition for Adoption of Rules
Section 16 deals with public requests that an agency promulgate,
amend, or repeal a rule. It provides that a person may petition the
agency to adopt, amend or repeal a rule and in so doing may set forth
pertinent data, views, and arguments. Within thirty days after submission of a petition the agency must initiate a rulemaking proceeding under sections 12 and 13, or deny the petition in writing, stating reasons
therefor.' 2 Thereafter the petitioner may seek court review under the
Act's judicial review provisions. 53 However, the scope of review of
a decision denying a petition to initiate rulemaking is limited to
whether the agency abused its discretion. 5 ,
151. A recent example of this situation would appear to involve the creation of a
Board of Nursing under id. § 90-159 (Cur.Supp. 1974), repealing Act of April 30,
1953, ch. 1199, § 1, [1953] N.C. Sess. Laws 1154 (replacing the Board of Nurse Registration and Nursing Education).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. §.150A-16 (Supp. 1974).
153. The denial of a petition for adoption of rules will constitute a "contested case"
for purposes of the judicial review provisions. Judicial review under the NC APA is
discussed in Part V infra. However, in brief, the stated conclusion follows since the
Act (1) provides for judicial review of "contest cases," id. § 150A-43; and (2) defines
contested case as "any proceeding . . . wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of
specific parties are determined." Id. § 150A-2(2). Accordingly an agency ruling that
denied a petition for adoption of rules would constitute a determination of a person's
legal right to have the agency initiate a rulemaking proceeding under the Act. See also
text accompanying notes 171-87 infra.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-16 (Supp. 1974).
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D. DeclaratoryRulings
The NC APA provides that in certain circumstances an agency
may issue a binding ruling to settle uncertainty or controversy.'"
Since informal action-even that affecting private rights and interests
-is the "life blood of the administrative process," 156 declaratory rulings
must be carefully distinguished from the innumerable consultations, informal exchanges of information, and other administrative advice-giving.
Indeed it has been noted that the informal inquiry is probably the most
commonly employed method of seeking an administrative agency's advice with respect to a particular matter. 15 7 This informal advice may
be given by legal counsel of an agency, a commissioner, or information
officer. It may take place orally in person, by telephone, or written
in a letter.158 Ordinarily such advice or consultation is not considered
to be binding on either the recipient or the agency. Yet this vital process is helpful, if not indispensable, to the efficient execution of agency
business. Thus while the declaratory ruling procedure may serve a
number of useful formal purposes, this device is not conceived as a replacement for informal procedures of advising and consulting.
By way of contrast the declaratory ruling device is a formal proceeding wherein a party may be advised in advance by an agency official empowered to issue a ruling which will be binding on both that
party and the agency. A declaratory ruling may be issued as to the
"validity of a rule or as to the applicability to a given state of facts
of a statute administered by the agency or of a rule or order of the
agency.1 159 How -thencan formal declaratory rulings and the vast bulk
of agency action-informal consultation, information exchange, advicegiving-be distinguished? The primary distinguishing factor is that
declaratory rulings are made pursuant to procedures specified by
agency rules. The Act requires that an agency "shall prescribe in its
rules the circumstances in which rulings shall and shall not be issued."'1t0
Accordingly, agencies must engage in a rulemaking proceeding for the
adoption of procedural rules governing declaratory rulings, under sections 12 and 13. As a general matter, however, it would appear that
adjudicatory hearings would not be necessary to the issuance of a de155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. § 150A-17.
ATrORNEY GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 239.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (Supp. 1974).
Id.
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claratory ruling.1 6
Declaratory rulings -are not available to the public at large and,
accordingly, cannot be regarded as mere advisory opinions. Instead
they are the administrative counterpart of judicial declaratory judgments. 16 2 The NC APA provides that the agency shall issue a declaratory ruling upon the request of a "person aggrieved."' 6 5 This is a traditional administrative law phrase, but for additional clarity it is defined
in section 2(6) as any person, firm, corporation or group of persons
who are "directly or indirectly" affected "substantially" in their person,
property, public office, or employment by an agency decision.'6
This
definition is substantively identical to interpretations reached by the
North Carolina Supreme Court for similar purposes under prior stat165
utes.
In a declaratory ruling an agency is given an opportunity to reassess the validity of a rule in the face of arguments advanced against
it. Also it is provided an opportunity to state its interpretation of a
statute it administers, or the applicability of its rule, to a particular set
of facts. Conversely, a person is allowed to seek an advance determination of how the agency views a contemplated course of conduct or
set of circumstances, without risking an after-the-fact determination
that such conduct would be treated by the agency as impenmissible. 66
However, this procedure is not without its troublesome aspects. A
regulated party, instead of good faith compliance attempts, may well
desire to push an activity or course of conduct to dubious extremes
without crossing the legally permissible line, and, in effect, wishes the
agency to aid him in this process, by advising him about a purely hypothetical set of facts. Also a sufficiently large number of requests for
declaratory rulings might well overburden agency staff or take them away
from other important activities. Moreover, in some instances, the
agency may not wish to state its position or its position may not be yet
161. See 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 242. It is noted that in section 8 of the
Revised Model State APA the drafters modified the original state APA "to eliminate
the provisions that denied binding effect to declaratory rulings unless issued after
[oral] argument . . . . [That] condition seemed to impose undue formality: there is
no reason why the agency's ruling should not be binding if based on written submissions
or conference, rather than oral argument." Id.
162. See 1 DAvis, TmEATIsn, supra note 67, § 4.10.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (Supp. 1974).
164. Id. § 150A-2(6). See also text accompanying notes 307-10 infra.
165. See In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963); Albemarle
Elec, Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972).
166. With respect to judicial review see text accompanying notes 160-411 infra.
See also 1 F. CooPEa, supra note 8, at 250-63.
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fully formulated. In recognition of such instances, section 17 permits an
agency to decline to issue a declaratory ruling "when the agency for good
cause finds the issuance of a ruling undesirable." When issued,
a ruling is binding on both the person requesting it and the agency,
except that, of course, the rule may be changed prospectively1 7
If the agency issues a declaratory ruling, attempts to state good
cause for refusing a ruling, or fails to issue any ruling on the merits
within sixty days, the decision is subject to judicial review. The scope
of review is determined under section 43.1

s

In connection with rule-

making, while an action for a declaratory judgment outside the Act may
be available to challenge a rule, it would appear that in the absence
of ,a request for a declaratory ruling, a party would not have met the
general requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.10 9 It
should be emphasized that the declaratory ruling procedure is the only
mechanism under the Act for seeking direct judicial review of agency
0
rules.
IV.

A.

17

ADmINISTRAnVE ADJUDICATION:

THE JUDICIAL ANALOGY

Characteristicsof the Adjudicatory Function

As in the case of administrative rulemaking,tm a precise definition
of "administrative adjudication" is very difficult. Perhaps the most
useful statement is that in performing this function administrative agencies are engaged in a process that very much resembles what courts
do.172 The touchstone for distinguishing adjudication from rulemaking
is that adjudication involves a specifically named party and a determination of particularized legal issues and facts with respect to that party.
Rulemaking, by contrast, involves general categories or classes of parties and facts and policies of general applicability. 178
The procedural protections applicable to the adjudicatory function
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (Supp. 1974).
168. The declaratory ruling provision provides for general judicial review "in the
same manner" as a contested case. With respect to scope of review of rulemaking see

text accompanying note 407 infra.

169. See text accompanying notes 322-45 infra.
170. This is so since section 43 provides for judicial review only in connection with
contested cases.
171. See text accompanying notes 69-78 supra.
172. 1 DAvis, TREATIsE, supranote 67, § 5.01, at 285-88.
173. The distinction is sometimes spoken of as involving "adjudicatory facts" in the
case of determinations involving specific, named parties; and "legislative facts" in the
case of determinations of general applicability. See generally id. § 7.02.
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are determined by the Act's definition of "contested case." "Contested
case" is defined by section 2(2) as "any agency proceeding, by what-

ever name called, wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are to be determined." 174 By its terms the definition specifically includes "rate making, price fixing, and licensing," and excludes "rule making" and "declaratory rulings." This means that the

agency adjudicatory procedures required in contested cases do not limit
procedures for rulemaking and issuing declaratory rulings.' 7 5
Under the vast majority of state APA's and the Federal APA, the

right to invoke the adjudication procedures is not provided by the
APA's themselves. Instead, the right under most APA's arises only
when rights, duties or privileges "are required by law to be determined

by an agency after an opportunity for hearing" or a like formulation. 176 Unlike this majority, the NC APA does not limit the
procedural protections governing adjudications to instances when the
constitution or statutes require a right to an evidentiary heating.
The NC A.PA's formulation is a distinct improvement since, when
there is no statute that requires a hearing, constitutional due process
issues are not involved in determining the applicability of its adjudication provisions.' 7 7 But the Act does present significant statutory interpretive problems, as distinguished from constitutional ones, in determining the applicability of the procedural requirements of the Act when
an arguable determination of the "legal rights, duties or privileges"
of specific parties is involved.

In resolving this issue the need to balance the competing considerations involved in interpreting and properly applying the Act should be
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Supp. 1974).

175. Id.
176. This is the formulation of section 1(2) of the Model State APA. A survey
reveals that this formulation has been adopted in some eighteen states, including
Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Additionally
a formulation in which the adjudication provisions apply when a hearing is required by
"law or constitution" may be found in Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Washington, West
Virginia and the District of Columbia; by "constitution or statute," in Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Oregon. The Federal APA adopts the "by statute"
formulation. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
177. For example, under the majority of APA's, in any instance where a statutory
right to hearing does not exist, an issue of whether a constitutional due process right
requires a hearing is necessarily presented in order to determine the applicability of the
APA. This constitutional issue will often -be difficult of resolution even for courts, and
in some instances therefore imposes an impossible prediction problem for an agency in
attempting to determine whether it must accord a person the protections specified in the
APA. See 1 F. CooPEm., supranote 8, at 135.
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kept in mind. An interest in procedural fairness, which mandates
some degree of formality at the expense of speed and efficiency, must
be balanced against an interest in not overburdening agencies with procedural requirements. The broadest interpretation of the language,
"proceeding ... wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific
parties are to be determined" could conceivably include all agency action involving specifically identified parties except instances expressly
excluded in the definition. An essential task in connection with the
adjudication provisions of the Act then is to interpret the definition so
that it will be neither unduly expansive nor unnecessarily restrictive.
(1)

The NC APA Requires a "Proceeding"

A critical word in the contested case definition is "proceeding."
The term connotes the conduct of business related to juridical matters.-17 It implies formality and specific statutory authorization to act
upon the matter at hand. In using the term "proceeding" it seems
clear that the legislature intended to encompass within the definition
of "contested case" all those instances in which an evidentiary hearing
would be required by either statute or constitution. Equally, however,
the Act clearly applies, without regard -to constitutional or statutory requirements, to other instances in which there is an administrative "proceeding" determining legal rights, duties or privileges of specific par1 9

ties.

A "proceeding" is any instance in which an administrative agency
makes a formal determination of a specifically named person's or party's individual legal rights, duties or privileges. Such a statement, of
course, is not self-executing -and does not provide an answer in particular cases. It is doubtful that definite answers can be provided except
upon a case-by-case analysis. In resolving individual cases, however,
the following general rule should be used as a guide: the procedural
protections of the contested case provisions should be applied in those
instances in which observance of the procedural requirements will increase fairness, enhance the likelihood of both rational and correct decisions, facilitate administrative acquisition of necessary data
and facts, improve administrative accountability, and lead to better
reasoned administrative decisions. Even when some of these purposes are furthered, observance of the procedures may prove to be
178. BLAcK's

LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
179. Otherwise the definition would almost certainly have been limited to such instances as is done in the overwhelming majority of APA's. See note 176 supra.
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unnecessary or unwise in light of considerations of cost, efficency, the insubstantiality of the interest affected, or the insubstantiality
of the effect upon the interest. For example, in connection with an
agency function in which the agency performs merely a ministerial task,
not requiring the exercise of discretion, the holding of an evidentiary
hearing would be meaningless. Examples of such situations might include instances of the issuance of applications, or directions for the
forms necessary to initiate an administrative determination of some
right, duty, or privilege. 180 When a factual determination is necessary, however, an oral hearing might enhance the likelihood of a fair
and correct decision. This logic would seem to apply even if the end
product of the administrative action was, for example, a non-discretionary grant or denial of a benefit or privilege.
(2) The NC APA Requires a "Determination"
Not all administrative decisions will constitute a "determination."
The terms "determine" and "determination" imply "coming to an end"
or "settling,"'' 1 although not necessarily in the sense of "a final agency
decision" for judicial review purposes, 182nor must the decision neces83
sarily be rendered "at the final or highest level within the agency."'
Accordingly, agency decisions that are preliminary, or prerequisite to a
conclusion of whether to initiate a "proceeding" would not constitute
a "determination."
Under the Massachusetts APA it has been held that the conducting of an investigation in the form of a preliminary inquiry, characterized by the court as being in the nature of a determination of probable
cause, is not an "adjudicatory proceeding." The court's reasoning, in
part, was that the decision made was not one in which the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of specifically named persons were "determined."' 84
180. See, e.g., 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 125-26.
181. BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY 536 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
182. See Part V infra.
183. The Ohio APA uses the term "adjudication" to perform the function that the
NC APA uses "contested case" to perform. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01(D) (Page
Supp. 1973). This section defines adjudication as "the determination by the highest or
ultimate authority of an agency of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person .

. . ."

The Ohio statute, with certain exceptions, re-

quires an opportunity for hearing in an "adjudication." Id. § 119.06 (Page 1969).
184. Miller v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 340 Mass. 33, 162 N.E.2d 656
(1959). It should be noted that the court's reasoning, in addition, rested on the
Massachusetts provision which defined adjudication to include instances when a hearing
was "required by constitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws." Id.
at 35, 162 N.E.2d at 657.
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A Final Problem with Contested Cases

Under the predecessor to the present Florida APA, which contained, in substance, a broad definition similar to the NC APA, 18 5 it was
held that the section governing administrative hearings pertained solely
to an administrative agency's performance of a "quasi-judicial function."'" 6 While the approach of the Florida court certainly helps to
confine the hearing right to manageable boundaries, the use of phrases

such as "quasi-judicial" may obscure careful reasoning about the ele87

ments involved.'
B.

Performanceof the Adjudicatory Function
(1)

Right to Notice and Hearing

Section 23(a) provides quite simply that "the parties in a contested case shall be given an opportunity for a hearing without undue

delay."' 8 8 Section 23(b) in turn, deals with the three elements of
notice adequacy: the time in which notice must be given, the manner
in which it is to be given, and the content of the notice. 180
185. "(2) Adjudication means agency proceeding for the formulation of an order.
(3) Order means the whole or any part of the final decision (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive or declaratory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rulemaking but including licensing." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.21 (Supp. 1973), as amended FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 120-32 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
186. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969). In holding that the issuance of a banking license was a quasi-executive or quasilegislative function the court reached an arguably erroneous result. It would appear that
the holding might better have been grounded on a competitor banker's lack of standing
to complain of the failure to hold a hearing on an application for a banking license with
respect to a competing banking location. Had the banking license application been denied, it would appear that a different result might be warranted if the applicant, as opposed to a competitor, were the complainant.
187. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a different context, has used the phrase
"quasi-judicial" to describe instances in which agency action "might result in a loss by
a specific party of some legal right, duty or privilege." In re Filing by Automobile Rate
Office, 278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971). In that case the issue before the court
was whether, in a ratemaking proceeding before the Commissioner of Insurance, compliance with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-317 to -318 (1974) (governing evidence in administrative proceedings) was required. The court held that the act applied to a "judicial
or quasi-judicial proceeding" and that ratemaking for the future was "an act legislative,
not judicial, in kind." Id. at 319, 180 S.E.2d at 319, citing Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). Since the NC APA repeals these provisions, see note
16 supra, and defines "contested case" specifically to include ratemaking, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Supp. 1974), the holding regarding the nature of a ratemaking pro.
ceeding, of course, would be changed.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-23(a) (Supp. 1974).
189. (b) The parties shall be given a reasonable notice of the hearing, which
notice shall include: (1) A statement of the date, hour, place, and nature of
the hearing; (2) A reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules
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There may be some difficulty in defining "undue delay" under
section 23. No definitive answer in the abstract can be provided,
since the nature and effect of any delay must necessarily depend upon
all the facts and circumstances in the particular case. At a minimum,
the right to a hearing requires notice reasonably in advance of the taking of administrative action. This means that the person affected must
be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response between the
giving of notice and the holding of the hearing. Conversely at a minimum, "without undue delay" certainly means that the notice must precede the action that may affect the subject interest.190
Failure to give reasonable advance notice has been described by
one court in a non-APA context as a "jurisdictional defect."' 911 Several courts have invalidated agency orders where adequate notice had
not been given, 192 including the North Carolina Supreme Court. 9 '
It is doubtful that a party may be heard to complain of an agency's
failure to give the required statutory notice, when actual notice has
been received or the party has participated in a proceeding.194 It has
been held, however, that a mere failure of a party to allege the existence of a meritorious defense to the claims asserted by an agency is
not a sufficient ground for justifying a lack of notice by the agency.' 95
Section 23(c) provides that notice shall 'be given "personally or
by registered mail." Where giving of notice in person or by registered
mail cannot be accomplished however, notice may then be given in a
manner prescribed in the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 4(j) 9
Section 23 (c) requires that -thenotice contain: "(1) A statement
involved; and (3) A short and plain statement of the factual allegations.
Id. § 15OA-23 (b). Section 23(e) is an open meeting or "sunshine" provision. Id. §
15OA-23(e). See also id. §§ 143-318.1-.5 (1974).
190. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
191. Bartlett v. Joint County School Comm., 11 Wis. 2d 588, 590, 106 N.W.2d 295,
296 (1960). See also State ex rel. Wilson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 867
(Mo. 1960).
192. E.g., Furniture Capital Truok Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3,10 Mich. 173,
65 N.W.2d 303 (1954); In re Richling, 154 Neb. 108, 47 N.W.2d 413 (1951); State
ex rel. Red Jacket Coal Corp. v. Stokes, 142W. Va. 126, 94 S.E.2d 634 (1956).
193. Brauff v. Commissioner of Revenue, 251 N.C. 452, 111 S.E.2d 620 (1959)
(constitution, in the absence of statute, requires notice to those whose rights are adversely affected). It should be noted that this case is unaffected by the NC APA since
it involves the Department of Revenue, which is excluded inter alia from the adjudication provisions of the Act. N.C. GnN. STAT. § 150A-1 (Supp. 1974).
194. 1 F. CooPER, supranote 8, at 276.
195. Cash v. Rocket Mg. Co., 223 Ark. 561, 267 S.W.2d 318 (1954).
196. N.C.R. Civ. P. 24.
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of the date, hour, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) A reference
and (3)
to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved;
' 10 7
allegations.
factual
the
of
A short and plain statement
Section 23 (d) regulates who may participate in a hearing other
than a named party. "Basic" intervention under section 23(d) is governed by rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for intervention "as of right" and "permissive intervention."108
In addition, section 23(d) provides for "discretionary intervention"
by providing that the agency may permit any interested person to
intervene "and participate in [the] proceeding to the extent deemed ap1 99
propriate."
(2) Place of Hearing
Section 24 contains the venue provision of the Act. The venue
provision, in effect, presumes that the ends of justice and the convenience of witnesses will be promoted (a) by holding the hearing in
any county in the state "in which any person whose property or rights
are the subject matter of the hearing maintains his residence" if the
hearing is being conducted by a hearing officer or less than a majority
of the agency, or (b) by holding the hearing in the county where the
agency maintains its principle office if the hearing is conducted by a
majority of the agency."' 0 Notwithstanding these presumptions, in
furtherance of the ends of justice and the convenience of witnesses, the
agency is authorized by the Act "in its discretion" to designate another
county. Moreover the affected person may agree to holding the hearing "in some other county."2 '
(3)

Conducting the Hearing

(a) Rights of parties
(i) Right to participate in the hearing
Section 25 of the Act governs the manner and extent of participation by parties in an adjudicatory hearing. Section 25(a) provides
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-23(c) (Supp. 1974).
198. See N.C.R. Cirv. P. 24.
199. The discretionary intervention is without limitation, and thus, in appropriato
instances, can be broader than permissive intervention under rule 24, since section 24(b)
contains specified requirements that limit intervention.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-24 (Supp. 1974). Notwithstanding that this provision uses the mandatory language "shall," it should be clear from the following textual
discussion that the mandatory language applies only when the agency does not choose
to exercise its discretion to designate another county to "promote the ends of justice or
better serve the convenience of witnesses."

201. Id.
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that if a party fails to appear after proper notice the agency may either
grant an adjournment or proceed with the hearing and "make its decision in the absence of the party." The section does not directly authorize
the granting of adjournments, but implicitly recognizes an agency's
power in its discretion to grant an adjournment. In the absence of an
adjournment the agency is authorized to proceed to a decision without a

party.

20 2

Under this provision, it might be asked whether a judgment in the
nature of a default may be rendered. Read in conjunction with section
36203 the conclusion is that default judgments in the traditional sense 20
may not be taken by an agency in a contested case hearing. Accordingly, notwithstanding the failure of a party to appear, the agency's decision is required to be rendered in a manner stated in section 36.205
Section 25(b) permits a party to file a written answer before the
date set for hearing. Since this section uses the permissive term
"may" it would appear that the Act does not require a party to file an
answer.20 6 However, it does appear that the agency may have a discretionary latitude (under the rulemaking provisions2 0 7) to promulgate reasonable rules governing the filing of a written answer, and even perhaps,
requiring it."8
Section 25(c) governs the essential elements of the hearing. It
provides that the parties "shall be given an opportunity to present arguments on issues of law and policy." In this provision there is some
ambiguity about whether the arguments may be oral or written. With
respect to issues of law and policy -the same basic considerations discussed in connection with the rulemaking hearing20 9 would seem to
apply. In short, based upon reasonable grounds, it would appear that
such arguments, in the agency's discretion, might be either written or
oral. However, the further provision of section 25(c)-that the parties
shall be given an opportunity "to present evidence on issues of fact"seems, almost certainly, to contemplate the offering of oral testimony.
It should be noted that with respect to factual issues, a trial-type proceeding is generally the best manner of proving facts. Insofar as the judicial
202. Id. § 150A-25.
203. See text accompanying notes 269-71 infra.
204. See N.C.R. Cirv. P. 55. See also id. 31 governing "stipulations."
205. For the elements of an agency decision see discussion of 'Section 36 in text accompanying notes 269-71 infra.
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-25(b) (Supp. 1974).
207. For a discussion of rulemaking see Part M supra.
208. See notes 257-58 and accompanying text infra.
209. See text accompanying notes 110-30 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

analogy is applicable, the norm in trial courts is the presentation of oral
evidence to establish or refute issues of fact.
The above conclusion is strengthened by section 25(d) that provides
that a party may "cross-examine any witness." Under the Act, a party
also must be permitted to cross-examine a witness (which necessarily
means oral testimony) who has prepared a document, if the document is
"prepared by, on behalf of, or for use of the agency and offered in
Section 25, of course, permits the offering of rebuttal evievidence."
210
dence.
(ii)

Consolidation

Section 26 permits an agency to consolidate "contested oases involving a common question of law or fact or multiple proceedings involving the same or related parties." It is designed to increase agency
efficiency and avoid unnecessary cost or delay. This section grants the
agency a broad discretion to order a joint hearing of an entire matter or
any part of it, to order all the cases consolidated, or to make "such
other orders concerning proceedings therein" as may tend to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.211 Here again reference to the practice of consolidation in court cases may be helpful. Moreover, since the agency
clearly seems to be delegated a substantial discretion, a review of a consolidation order would seem to be limited to whether the agency has
abused its discretion.
(iii) Subpoenas
Section 27, which governs the issuance of subpoenas, is directed to
the problem of the agency's and the party's rights in a contested case
hearing to have compulsory process for the acquisition of facts and
data. 2 12 The subpoena provision in the NC APA differs in two respects
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-25(d) (Supp. 1974).
211. Id. § 150A-26.
212. Subpoena.-An agency is hereby authorized to issue subpoenas upon its
own motion or upon a written request. When such written request is made
by a party in a contested case, an agency shall issue subpoenas forthwith requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence including books, records, correspondence, and documents in their possession or under their control. On written request, the agency shall revoke a subpoena if, upon a hearing the agency finds that the evidence, the production of
which is required, does not relate to a matter in issue, or if the subpoena does
not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence the production of which
is required, or if for any other reason sufficient in law the subpoena is invalid.
Witness fees shall be paid by the party requesting the subpoena to subpoenaed
witnesses in accordance with G.S. 7A-314.
Id. § 150A-27. The Model State APA is silent on the question of subpoena power, as
are many state APA's. 1 F. CooPE., supra note 8, at 295. A survey reveals that at
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from a significant number of state APA's. First, the Act itself empowers agencies to issue subpoenas. Second, the Act does not contain a
specific provision regarding enforcement of agency subpoenas (nor conversely does it expressly provide that agencies themselves have subpoena enforcement power).,s 3
It has been stated to be the general rule that agencies have no inherent power to issue subpoenas2 14 and that generally there is a legislative
reluctance to grant agencies a power to impose contempt pnalties for
refusal to comply with administrative subpoenas.21 5
The NC APA, section 27, provides that "[an agency is hereby
authorized to issue subpoenas upon its own motion or upon a written
least ten state administrative procedure acts do not contain subpoena provisions. These
states include Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont.
213. A survey reveals that some twenty state administrative procedure acts do contain specific provisions with respect to subpoenas. The majority of these (fourteen) specifically require applications to the courts (generally a lower court of general jurisdiction) for an enforcement order if a subpoena is not obeyed. These states include
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Only two states have
been found with provisions that appear to be similar to the NC APA. ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 2406 (1964); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (Page 1969). Virginia's
provision may be similar in effect, but is difficult to classify. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.10
(d)(1973).
214. 1 F. CooPi, supra note 8, at 295. But the North Carolina Supreme Court
has held that an agency with a legislative grant of power to issue subpoenas has inherent
power to adjudge in contempt and punish a duly sworn witness for refusal to testify at
a statutorily authorized hearing. In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791 (1931). The
agency involved in Hayes was the Utilities Commission (exempted from the NC APA)
which was acting under its enabling act. A distinction might be drawn between that
situation and a situation involving a general conferral of subpoena power in a broad statute such as the NC APA. It must be noted, however, that the holding in Hayes was
made even in face of a subpoena enforcement scheme substantially identical to that established in the NC APA, in which application for enforcement could be made to the
court. The case is arguably erroneous.
See generally 1 DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 67, § 3.11, at 215; L. JAFFEE, JumcIm.
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATVE ACTON 115-20 (abr. student ed. 1965).
215. 1 F. COOPER,supra note 8, at 297. Some state courts have invalidated statutes,
on state constitutional grounds, which vested agencies with power to impose contempt
penalties for refusal to comply with agency orders. People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296
P. 271 (1931) (statute purporting to authorize Public Utilities Commission to punish
by contempt for violating commission's order held unconstitutional since to punish for
contempt is a judicial power under Colorado constitution and the commissiork is not a
court); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892) (statute empowering
state board of tax commissioners to enforce subpoena by fine or commitment for contempt held unconstitutional under Indiana constitution since the board is an executive
department of state, and punishment for contempt is a power that belongs exclusively
to the courts); cf. In re Sims, 54 Kan. 1, 37 P. 135 (1894); Roberts v. Hackney, 109
Ky. 265, 58 S.W. 810 (1900). But see N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 3, discussed in note 287
infra; State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968). A number
of state courts have upheld agency power to punish for contempt. See cases cited in
I DAVIS, TATISE, supra note 67, § 3.11, at 215 nn.15 & 16.
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request." Under the Act an agency upon written request by a party in
a contested case "shall issue subpoenas forthwith." The subpoena may
require the attendance and testimony of witnesses, as well as the production of evidence, including books, records, correspondence, and
documents.
Under section 27 a person wishing to challenge a subpoena before
the agency must make a written objection. Upon such an objection
this section requires the holding of a hearing -to determine whether the
subpoena should be revoked. The hearing is to decide whether the items
requested relate to a matter in issue, whether the subpoena describes
with sufficient particularity the items to be produced, and whether any
other reasons exist for which the subpoena is invalid.210
As to the enforcement of subpoenas, section 27, read in conjunction
with sections 33(2) and (6),21 7 provides a clear inference that agencies
do not have power to punish for contempt. It is not clear, however,
whether a person subpoenaed must risk contempt in order to get a
judicial determination of the validity of the subpoena. This problem
arises because the Act does not provide for a pre-enforcement judicial
determination of the validity of ,the subpoena. Accordingly, if upon
objection a subpoena is sustained by the agency and a party does not
then comply, it appears -that the agency may under section 33(6) apply
to the superior court for a contempt proceeding. This problem, however, may be more apparent than real for three reasons. First, a party
might seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a subpoena after
it is sustained by the agency and prior to the termination of the agency
hearing. 18 Second, in a case in which the validity of the subpoena
appeared to be a close question, the agency might stay its compliance
order, provided that the person subject to the subpoena expeditiously
undertakes to secure a judicial determination of the subpoena's validity.
Third, since ordinarily it would appear that failure to comply with
an agency subpoena would involve civil contempt only, even assuming
that a party was incorrect in urging a subpoena's invalidity, and assum216. Under this provision, a compendium of reasons that might be advanced in
objecting to a subpoena include the following: (1) lack of relevancy; (2) undue burden or cost of compliance; (3) the matter under inquiry is not within the agency's jurisdiction; (4) the matters sought are described too generally and, in effect, the subpoena
is in furtherance of a "fishing expedition"; and (5) the matter sought is privileged under
legally recognized doctrines. See 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 299-311.
•217. See notes 257-58 and accompanying text infra.
218. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 57, 65. Rule 57 provides that: "The court may order a
prompt hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar." However, this would be a cumbersome procedure.
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big further that a party would be in contempt of an agency if the
subpoena should be judicially upheld, it would appear to be a relatively simple matter for -the person at that point to purge the "technical" contempt by complying.
Finally, the Act provides that fees shall be paid to witnesses according 219
to the uniform fees for witnesses provision of the General
Statutes.
(iv) Depositions and discovery
Section 28 provides for the use of depositions and for a party
to a contested case to be able to make discovery of identifiable agency
records.22° When taken in compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 ' a deposition may be used in lieu of other evidence in a
contested case proceeding. The section also authorizes agencies to
adopt rules (under the rulemaking provisions of -the Act) for discovery
under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The statute contains an exception for records related solely to the internal procedures of the agency or
records which are exempt from disclosure by law. These am, not
subject to discovery.
(v)

Evidence

The question of the receipt of evidence in agency adjudications
has been a subject of some controversy. 222 In North Carolina, prior
to the NC APA, the issue was the subject of two legislative acts228 as
well as comment. 2 -4
Section 29 governing administrative agency receipt of evidence
deals with one of two aspects 225 of the evidentiary problem in admin219. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-27 (Supp. 1974). The uniform fees for witnesses
provision is id. § 7A-314.
220. Id. § 150A-28.
221. N.C.R. CIrv. P. 26-37.
222. See generally ATron EY GENERA.'s REPORT, supra note 7, at 70-71; R. BENJAMm, supranote 8, at 170-94; 2 DAvis, TREATIsE, supra note 67, §§ 14.01-.07.
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-317 to -318 (1974) (entitled "Rules of Evidence in
Administrative Proceeding before State Agencies"); id. § 150-16 (rules of evidence contained in the Uniform Revocation of Licenses Act). Both of these acts are repealed
by the NC APA. See note 16 supra.
224. Professor Hanft has made a thorough and detailed analysis of the evidence issues, and no attempt will be made herein to duplicate his work. Hanft, Some Aspects
of Evidence in Adjudication by Administrative Agencies in North Carolina,49 N.C.L.
REv. 635 (1971). See also Comment, Administrative Law-Evidence Before North
CarolinaTribunals, 19 N.C.L. REv. 568 (1941).
225. The other aspect of evidence is concerned with the quantum of evidentiary sup-
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istrative adjudication. Section 29 contains, in substance, three evidence provisions. First, the Act contains a mandatory requirement
that "irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence shall be
excluded." Second, as a general rule, the rules of evidence as applied
in the trial division of the General Court of Justice "shall be followed."
Third, as an exception to the general rule, the Act provides that "when
evidence is not reasonably available" under the general rule, facts
"may be shown by the most reliable and substantial evidence available. 220
These provisions present a variety of problems. Before analyzing each of the provisions, however, it should be noted that the formulation of section 29 represents, in effect, a middle ground between
a "strict" rule of evidence 2 7 and a "liberal" rule of evidence. 228

Section 29 differs from North Carolina's 1967 restrictive statute since
it does not require that hearsay or other "incompetent" evidence be
excluded.

29

On the other hand, section 29 is not as unrestrictive as the formulation found in the Uniform Revocation of Licenses Aot which permitted certain licensing boards to admit "any evidence" and to "give
probative effect to evidence that is of a kind commonly relied on by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of serious affairs." 2 0
port required to sustain an agency decision upon judicial review. This question is governed by section 51(5) and is discussed in Part V infra.
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-29(a) (Supp. 1974).
227. An example of a "strict" rule is id. § 143-318(1) (1974) (repealed by the NC
APA, see note 16 supra), which provides in pertinent part that: "Incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, unduly repetitious, and hearsay evidence shall be excluded."
228. An example of a "liberal" rule is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-18 (1974) (repealed
by the NC APA, see note 16 supra), which provides:
Rules of evidence.-In proceedings held pursuant to this Chapter, boards
may admit any evidence and may give probative effect to evidence that is of
a kind commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of serious affairs. Boards may in their discretion exclude incompetent, irrelevant,
immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence. In proceedings involving the suspension, revocation, or the withholding of the renewal of a license, rules of
privilege shall be applicable to the same extent as in proceedings before the
courts of this State.
229. The need to eliminate -these two requirements was among the principal reasons
Professor Hanft concluded that the strict evidence provision should be replaced. Hanft,
supra note 224, at 680. This conclusion was based inter alha on the fact that such a
restrictive provision "threw into reverse the trend of the law concerning rules of evidence
before administrative agencies," id. at 636, so that enforcement of evidence rules should
be relaxed in cases involving administrative proceedings. Id. at 659.
230. See note 228 supra. Professor Hanft noted that this formulation constituted
"an uncertain guide" because one federal court applying the formula held that under it
hearsay evidence could support a finding, while another federal court stated that responsible persons were not accustomed to relying on hearsay in serious affairs. Hanft,
supra note 224, at 641.
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Beyond the mandatory exclusion, the NC APA contains a basic re231
quirement that the rules of evidence "as applied" in the trial courts
shall be followed. The Act does not indicate whether this is intended to
mean the rules as applied in jury trial cases or in cases tried before a
judge. The drafters of the NC APA thus adroitly skirted an acute dilemma. If jury trial rules were required the drafters would have to
confront the challenge that those rules are "a misfit for the administrative process '232 since a great many agencies are manned by persons untrained in law with the consequence that it can "hardly . . .
be expected that 'they [the agency personnel] will be conspicuously
successful in applying the technical, difficult, and often confused rules
of evidence. ' 23 3 Requiring nonjury rules merely shifts the criticism
to the persuasive argument that in cases tied before a judge without
a jury exclusionary rules simply are not "applied. '28 4 Thus are dilemmas made. A practical solution would be to construe the "as applied
in trial courts" requirement to mean the evidence which could be relied upon by a judge (as opposed -to received) in nonjury cases. Such
a solution would avoid problems of jury trial exclusionary rules but
would still mean at least 'that only evidence with some probative value
could be relied upon by an agency, even if other evidence had been
admitted.23 5
The next problem is determining the scope and extent to which
the rules applied in the trial courts (whatever they are) may be foregone under the Act. As an exception to the basic rule, when evidence
is not "reasonably available" under trial court rules to show relevant
facts, such facts may be shown by "the most reliable and substantial
evidence available." The quoted phrases raise two critical inquiries:
first, when is evidence not reasonably available, and second, what
evidence constitutes the most reliable and substantial available?
It is doubtful that 'a determination of "reasonably available" can
be made except upon a balancing in a particular proceeding of the
231. The appellate division includes the court of appeals and the supreme court,
N.C. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 5; thus leaving the superior and district court divisions as the
Trial Division. The strict evidence act specifically referred to the "superior and district
court divisions of the General Court of Justice." N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 143-318(1)
(1974), repealed, Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1331, § 2, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 691,
703.
232. 2 DAVIs, TREATISE, supranote 67, § 14.03.
233. Hanft, supranote 224, at 637.
234. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 4(b), at 34-35 (3d ed. 1940). See also 2 DAvis,
TREATISE,

supra note 67, at 14.04.

235. See text accompanying notes 391-404 infra.
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importance of and need for the evidence against the cost and burden
of acquiring or producing it.23s Naturally, the amount that a party
can be expected to spend to procure evidence certainly will vary depending upon the value of the matter in controversy, as well as the importance
of establishing a particular fact to the resolution of an overall controversy.
Assuming that evidence is not reasonably available under the
basic rule, -the type of evidence that might be deemed the "most reliable and substantial available" cannot be evaluated except with respect to particular facts and circumstances. This generally seems to
address the trustworthiness of the available evidence, its probative
value and the available methods. for testing its likely truthfulness. In
connection with these factors, evidence may be seen as existing along
a spectrum: from utterly worthless (of no probative value with respect
to establishing a fact) to highly -reliable and trustworthy (strongly
supporting the existence of an ,asserted fact). It is impossible that utterly worthless evidence could be shown to be the "most reliable and
substantial evidence available." Beyond such a statement, it is doubtful that a general rule can be formulated. However, a distinction
should be drawn between the most -reliable and substantial evidence
that a party will be allowed to introduce (assuming evidence meeting the basic rule is not available) and the quantum of evidence
necessary to sustain an agency finding of fact, when the agency's decision is before the court upon judicial review.287
236. Virginia's APA contains an evidence rule that provides a statutory balancing
formulation:
Rules of evidence in contested cases.-In contested cases:
a) All relevant and material evidence shall be received,,except that:
1) the rules relating to privileged communications and privileged topics shall
be observed; (2) hearsay evidence shall be received only if the declarant is not
readily available as a witness; and (3) secondary evidence of the contents of
the document shall be received only if the original is not readily available. In
deciding whether a witness or document Is readily available the agency shall
balance the importance of the evidence against the difficulty of obtaining it,
and the more important the evidence is, the more effort should be made to produce the eyewitness or the originaldocument.
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.11 (1973) (emphasis added).
237. The evidence that an agency may receive and may rely upon, of course, is
closely related to the evidentiary support that must be found in the record of an agency
decision to sustain a decision on judicial review. See text accompanying notes 385-404
infra. But the judicial review problem is distinguishable from the question of what evidence parties may offer or agencies may receive. For example, in an agency hearing
a question may arise as to the existence of a particular historical event. Testimony by
the eyewitness ("Witness A") to the occurrence might be the best method of proving
the fact. However, if Witness A is out of the country, this might make testimonial evidence by Witness A "not reasonably available." Assuming that Witness A had relayed
his observations to a person available to testify ("Witness B"), can Witness B's testi-
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Some APA's specifically address the question of testimonial privileges. The NC APA provides for the recognition of privileges through
its basic requirement that the rules of evidence as applied in trial
courts be observed. This conclusion follows since the excepion to the
evidence rules applied in trial courts is concerned with instances in
which evidence meeting the basic rules is not available, and not with
disregarding court-recognized privileges. Section 29(b) requires that
all evidence in a contested case be made a part of the record. Moreover, factual information or evidence not in the record may not be
considered in the determination of the contested case (except matters
officially noticed under section 30). Documentary evidence may be
received in the form of copies or excerpts, or may be incorporated by
reference if such incorporated documents are available for examination by the parties. If a timely request is made, a party shall be
given "an opportunity -to compare the copy with the original if available." 3
(vi)

Official notice

Section 30 provides for two instances in which evidentiary proof
of facts may be -foregone in a contested case proceeding. First, an
agency may take official notice of "all facts of which judicial notice
may be taken." Secondly, official notice may be taken of "other facts
within the specialized knowledge of the agency."2' 9 The latter formulation is addressed -tothose instances in which the agency through its
operation has developed a special competence. This refers to factual
knowledge developed through the agency's execution of its statutorily
prescribed functions. It appears that the factual knowledge must be
peculiar to the agency holding the contested case hearing since section
30 employs the term "the agency." This would appear to mean that
one agency may not take official notice of facts within the specialized
knowledge of some other agency.
mony constitute the "most reliable and substantial evidence available"? It would appear
that Witness B's testimony might meet the test, notwithstanding that it constitutes hearsay. On judicial review, however, unless Witness B's testimony is corroborated by
other evidence (for example, circumstantial evidence), or if when weighed against other
evidence the testimony is significantly undercut, a court might be justified in finding that
the hearsay evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that the event occurred. This
would seem possible even though Witness B's testimony was, for admission purposes, the
most reliable and substantial evidence available to the party presenting it.
238. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-29(b) (Supp. 1974).
239. Id. § 1SOA-30.
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When an agency wishes to notice a fact, the noticed fact and its
source must be stated and made known to affected parties "at the
earliest practicable time." Any party upon timely request "shar' be afforded an opportunity to dispute that fact through submission of evidence and argument. 240 Finally, section 30 provides that "an agency
may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to it." It is unclear
whether this provision refers only to evidence presented to dispute a
noticed fact, or evidence presented during the entire course of a contested case hearing. Since many agencies are created specifically
for the purpose of institutionalizing certain experience (technical
competence and specialized knowledge), a reasonable argument can
be made that such experience may be used in the evaluation of any
evidence presented at any time during a hearing. An agency would be
unreasonably restricted if it could not employ its experience, competence, or knowledge gained in its work. The use of special experience, competence, or knowledge is safeguarded when section 30 is
read in connection with section 36.241
(vii)

Stipulations

The Act's provisions regarding stipulations are designed to permit agencies in contested cases to expedite determinations. The Act
allows -the omission of proof of designated facts by agreement and,
except when otherwise provided by law, disposition of an entire contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, waiver,
default, or other methods agreed upon by the parties.
The Act requires that a stipulation involving facts in a controversy be in writing and filed with the agency. 242 The requirement of
a writing precludes the possibility of a party's becoming bound by a
tacit -admission or failure to controvert facts.
For purposes of the definition of the term "parties" in section 31,
section 2(5) defines "party" to include the agency. Accordingly, the
provision that "parties" should agree upon facts when practicable is
an encouragement to both outside partieg and the agency itself to
agree to facts which are not genuinely controverted. 248
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 269-71 infra.
N.C. Gm. STAT. § 150A-31 (Supp. 1974).
Cf. N.C.R. Cirv. P. 37(c).
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Section 31(b) permits the disposition of an entire contested case
by methods other than hearing and decision based on evidence introduced. The omission from section 31(b) of the requirement that the
various forms of agreed settlements be "in writing," as required by section 31(a) with respect to stipulations of facts, permits the inference
that agreed settlements need not necessarily be written except when an
"agreed settlement" is made by stipulating facts. The Missouri Court
of Appeals reached the conclusion under that state's APA -that an
agreed settlement might come about by a course of conduct of the
parties.24
A second issue -thatmight arise is whether an agency's acceptance
of an agreed settlement constitutes a "decision" under section 36 of
the Act, which requires the agency to state findings of fact and conclusions of law.2 45 The section permitting, in effect, informal disposition
of contested cases could not achieve its purpose if it were subjected to
the requirements of section 36, so long as evidence of the agreed settlement or consent order is available. Nevertheless, it may be good
practice for agencies when engaging in this informal mode of settling
contested cases to make an adequate record so that the reason for
dispensing with the requirements of section 36 will clearly appear.
Similarly, this will protect parties to contested cases, other than the
agency, by memorializing for them the basis of -the agency's decision.

24 6

(b) Hearingofficers and powers
Section 32 governs the persons who may be designated to conduct a contested case hearing. Section 32(a) provides that an
agency, one or more members of the agency, a person or group of
persons designated by statute, or one or more hearing officers desig244. Davis v. Long, 360 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
245. See notes 269-71 and accompanying text infra.
246. A counterargument to this conclusion may be based on the proposition that
section 36 does not contain an exception to the findings-and-conclusions requirement for
dispositions under section 31(b). This could be buttressed by citation of a provision
like that of Missouri which contains an express exception for cases "disposed of by stipulation, consent order or agreed settlement." Mo. STAT. ANN. § 536.090 (Vernon Supp.
1975).
A contrary proposition is that the essential purpose of the provision is to permit
informal dispositions to dispense with the requirements of formal decisions. If this is
correct, the language used in other acts to accomplish this purpose would be relevant,
particularly the Revised Model State APA, which uses the term "informal disposition"
to refer -to agreed dispositions. MODEL STATE APA § 9(d), quoted in 1961 HANBOOK,
supra note 18, at 214.
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nated and authorized by the agency to handle contested cases, shall be
hearing officers. This section provides generally that hearings shall
be conducted in an impartial manner.2 47 Tying into .the requirement
of impartial hearings, section 32(b) provides that a party may file, in
good faith, "a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of a hearing officer." Upon such a filing "the agency"
shall determine the matter as part of the record in the contested case,
with its determination being subject to judicial review "at the conclusion of the proceeding."' 48
Section 32 is not a standard provision in the state APA's240 and
appears clearly to be modeled after the Federal APA. 5 ° Procedurally, it appears that the Act contemplates that an affidavit of bias or
disqualification may be filed with the hearing officer at -the initiation
of a hearing or prior to initiation. Since the Act requires, however, that "the agency" make a determination of asserted bias or disqualification, the affidavit apparently must be transmitted by the hearing officer to the "agency" itself. It seems reasonably clear that a
hearing officer may not make a determination concerning his own alleged bias or disqualification.2 51 The Act further makes it clear that if
the agency's decision is that the hearing officer is not disqualified,
judicial -review may be had of that decision, but "at the conclusion
of the proceeding."
247. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-32(a) (Supp. 1974).
248. Id. § 150A-32(b).

249. The Revised Model State APA does not contain an analogous provision. See
1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 331.
250. The federal provision is contained in the section commonly referred to as sec.
tion 7(a), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970), and contains language that is substantially similar
to the NC APA as follows:
(b) There shall preside at the taking of evidence(1) the agency;
(2) one or more members of the body which comprises the agency;
or
(3)one or more hearing examiners appointed under section 3105 of
this title.
This subchapter does not supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings, in whole or in part, by or before boards or other employees specially pro.
vided for by or designated under statute. The functions of presiding employees
and of employees participating in -decisions in accordance with section 557 of
this title shall be conducted in an impartial manner. A presiding or participating employee may at any time disqualify himself. On the filing in good faith
of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other disqualification
of a presiding or participating employee, the agency shall determine the matters
as a part of the record and decision in the case.
251. 2 DAvis, TREATIS, supra note 67, § 12.05, at 167. The cited reference is with

respect to the Federal APA, after which the NC APA appears to be modeled. See note
250 and accompanying text supra.
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The Act does not contain a definition of "personal bias" nor does
it provide the standards for disqualification of an administrative hearing officer. Accordingly, the standards must be determined by reference to other law.25 2 It may be noted however, that the -term "personal bias" is a term of art. It has been held that a substantial showing of bias is necessary to disqualify a hearing officer,2 5 3 that a strong
conviction on questions of law and policy does not disqualify, 2 54 and
that even upon a showing of bias or disqualifying factors "the rule of
necessity" may permit the officer or agency to hear the case when
255
no -available alternative method exists.

Section 32(c) is addressed to those instances in which a hearing

officer is disqualified or "it is impracticable for him to continue the
hearing." In such an instance -another hearing officer "shall be assigned to continue with the case unless it is shown that substantial
prejudice to any party will result therefrom, in which event a new
hearing shall be held or the case dismissed without prejudice." 256 In
determining whether a new hearing shall be -held, the Act requires a
party to show "that substantial prejudice" will result if a successor is

permitted to continue the hearing. Instances will perhaps occur when
the prejudice will ,be so substantial that a new hearing must be held.
However, the Act appears to permit balancing the effect of any prejudice from continuing the hearing against the burden of holding a new
one. Accordingly, if a hearing officer becomes unavailable at the outset of a lengthy hearing the prejudice of continuing the hearing, if
252. See generally 1 F. Coopin, supra note 8, at 338-50; 2 DAVIs, TEATISE, supra
note 67, §§ 12.01-.06, at 163-66.
253. United States ex rel. De Luca v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1954).
254. See generally 2 DAvis, TREATISE, supra note 67, § 12.01.
255. See generally 1 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 348-50; 2 DAvis, TEATISE, supra
note 67, § 12.04. The rule is subject to numerous practical solutions, e.g., if one hearing
officer is involved, a temporary or special one may substitute; if only some members
of an agency are involved, the unbiased members may be allowed to act; and, when going forward under the so-called rule is permitted, court scrutiny upon judicial review may
be broader and more intensive. Id. § 12.04, at 163-66. As a matter of policy, agencies
should explore all feasible alternatives to avoid going forward with a hearing conducted
by either a biased officer, agency member, or agency. Indeed in some circumstances
due process may limit the extent to which the rule of necessity may be invoked. Id.
§ 12.04, at 165.
256. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-32(c) (Supp. 1974). Debilitating illness of the hearing officer is a good situation for application of this subsection. Instances exist, for example, when a trial judge after trial, but before decision, becomes unavailable by reason
of his death and the parties agree to permit a successor judge to decide the case based
on the trial court record and oral argument before the successor. E.g., Coffey v.
Romney, P-H EQUAL OPPoRTUNITY iN HoUSING REP.
13,588 (M.D.N.C., Nov. 11,
1972).
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any, would appear less substantial than in the hearing's later stages.
However, a lesser showing of prejudice in the early stages may require undertaking a new hearing. Conversely, when a lengthy hearing has reached its later stage it would appear that the prejudice
would have to outweigh the burden of holding a new hearing.
Section 33 sets forth a list of specific powers that a hearing officer may exercise.1 7 This section is applicable when the hearing officer is someone other -than the agency itself (or all the agency members). When the agency or its -members are conducting a hearing
the powers which they may exercise are those of the agency. Section
33 uses the permissive term "may" inasmuch as the hearing officer's
exercise of the powers enumerated would depend on the agency's subdelegation to him of those powers.2 8s To the extent that an agency
has subdelegated such power to the hearing officer, that officer may
administer oaths and affirmations, sign and issue subpoenas in the
name of the agency, provide for the taking of testimony by deposition, regulate the course of the hearing, direct the parties to appear
and confer to consider simplification of the issues upon consent of the
parties, and apply to the superior court for proceedings to enforce
agency subpoenas.
It may be recalled that section 27 authorizes issuance of subpoenas and provides that "the 'agency shall revoke a subpoena!' on the
grounds stated in section 27. Section 33(2) speaks only of signing
and issuing subpoenas. It does not indicate whether a hearing officer, as opposed to the agency, may rule on a request that a subpoena
be revoked. But it would appear that a revocation decision would be
made in the same manner that a decision on the issues in the con257. Powers of hearing offier.-A hearing officer may:
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) Sign and issue subpoenas in the name of the agency, requiring attendance
and giving of testimony by witnesses and the production of books, papers, and
other documentary evidence;
(3) Provide for the taking of testimony by deposition;
(4) Regulate the course of the hearings, set the time and place for continued
hearings, and fix the time for filing of briefs and other documents;
(5) Direct the parties to appear and confer to consider simplification of the
issues by consent of the parties; and
(6) Apply to the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, during
or subsequent to a hearing for an order to show cause why any person should
not be held in contempt of the agency and its processes, and the Court shall
have the power to impose punishment as for contempt for acts which would
constitute direct or indirect contempt if the acts occurred in an action pending
in superior court.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-33 (Supp. 1974).
258. See generally 1 DAvis, TREAT s, supranote 67, §§ 9.01-.07.
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tested case would be made. This means that the agency's decisionmaking process in contested oases will determine whether the hearing
officer initially may rule upon a revocation request.
(c) Decisionmakingin contested cases
Sections 34, 35, 36, and 37 of the Act govern the decisionmaking
process, the form and content of decisions, and the manner of record making in the adjudication of contested cases.
(i)

Proposed decision

Section 34 provides explicitly for those instances in which the
agency decisionmaker is not the hearing officer and, implicitly, for
those instances in which the decision is to be rendered by the hearing officer. Section 34(a) provides that when the official or a majority of the officials of the agency who make the final decision are
not the persons who have heard a contested case, a proposal for decision must be served on the parties prior to a decision, and the parties given an opportunity to file exceptions, to propose findings of
fact, and to present oral and written arguments to the final decisionmaker.25 9

The proposal -for decision must set fortth proposed findings of
fact and proposed conclusions of law, and be prepared by the hearing
officer unless the hearing officer becomes unavailable .to the agency.
If the hearing was conducted by more fthan one person, any one of the
persons who conducted the hearing may prepare the proposed decision. Under section 34(b), however, if no person who has conducted
the hearing is available, findings may be prepared by one who has
read the record, except in those instances in which "demeanor of witnesses is a factor." If demeanor is 'a factor in the hearing, and the
person who conducted the hearing is not available, that portion of the
hearing involving demeanor must be reheard, or the case dismissed
without prejudice.2"" But section 34(c) provides additionally -that the
parties may, by a written stipulation or orally at the hearing, waive
the requirement for a proposed decision as well as the other requirements of section 34.261

Determining when demeanor of witnesses is

a factor may present problems.

Demeanor will likely not be a fac-

259. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-34(a) (Supp. 1974).
260. Id. § 150A-34(b).
261. Id. § 150A-34(c).
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tor when the proof is by documentary evidence, the evidence is other
than oral testimony, or the credibility of a witness can be evaluated
without observing the witness. Instances of the latter situation might
occur when (1) testimony is uncontroverted, (2) testimony without
regard to demeanor is unbelievable 62 or (3) testimony relates to matters of which official notice may be taken. 263
Another problem involves the application of seotion 34 when the
person who conducted the hearing is unavailable and demeanor of
witnesses is a factor. A hearing officer would seem to have a considerable latitude to require, for example, a party asserting that demeanor of witnesses is a factor to designate those portions of the hearing -to be held again. It should be emphasized that the entire hearing need -not be held again but merely "the portions of the hearing
involving demeanor." Accordingly -a hearing officer might well be
alert for dilatory tactics (for example, a party refuses to designate reasonably narrow portions of a hearing but, instead insists on a broadranging rehearing). Such tactics could, of course, be devastating for
the conduct of hearings and, if the hearing officer did not have such
discretion, could cause unnecessary delay.
(ii)

Communication'with respect to the proposed decision

Section 35 is addressed to the decisionmaker's communications
with respect to the decision prior to its rendering. This section prohibits communication by the agency decisionmaker or the person who
is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case
with respect to "any issue of fact," with any person or party (or
party's representative). This section further prohibits direct and indirect communication with any party or party's representative with
respect to "any issue of law" except upon notice and opportunity for
all parties to participate.264 Both of the above prohibitions are subject to an exception when communication is "required for deposition of
an ex parte265 matter authorized by law. '266 Prohibitions contained
262. Such testimony is sometimes referred to as "inherently incredible." Testimony
of a fact that is contrary to the laws of nature or physical facts would be examples.
263. For a discussion of official notice see text accompanying notes 239-41 supra.

264. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 150A-35 (Supp. 1974).

265. BLACK'S LAW DICTOTAPtY 661 (4th ed. 1951) defines "ex parte" as "Coln one
side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on application of, one party
only."
266. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-35 (Supp. 1974). The best illustration of an ex parte
court proceeding is one in which a temporary restraining order is issued on application
of one party, against another party when the party against whom the order runs has
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in section 35 begin at the time of the notice of the hearing.
It should be noted that the provisions regarding communication
with respect to facts prohibits communications with "any person,"
whereas -theprohibition with respect to issues of law prohibits communicating "with any party or his representative." The purpose for this
is well-settled. With issues of law it is common that decisionmakers
go beyond communication with the parties and do not limit themselves
2 67
to the evidence and argument put into the record at the hearing.
Neither of the section 35 prohibitions, however, applies to members or staff of the agency "other than the staff which has been or is
engaged in investigating or prosecuting functions in connection with
the ease under consideration or a factually related case." Finally section 35 "does not apply" to an agency employee, or party Trepresentative "with professional training in accounting, actaarial science, economics, financial analysis, or rate making in a contested case insofar as
the case involves rate making or financial practices or conditions. '' 2 "s
(ii)

Rendering the decision

Section 36 governs the manner and form in which decisions must
be rendered. The basic purposes of section 36 are generally that the
not been heard prior to issuance of the order. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(b). In an agency
context, a summary suspension of a license under section 3(c) might be an ex parte proceeding.
267. See, e.g., Hanft, supra note 224, at 643, in which during a discussion of
whether in determining a rule or policy an agency is limited to the record, it is noted
that "judges may even informally consult law professors, specialists in their fields, seeking light on law in connection with cases before them." Section 35, in drawing a distinction between communication with respect to facts and law, follows the precedent of
section 13 of the Revised Model State APA. ]inthe Model APA, the drafter's comment
to section 13 states that "[tlhis section is intended to preclude litigious facts reaching
the deciding minds without getting into the record. Also precluded is ex parte discussion
of the law with the party or his representative. No objection is interposed to discussion
of the law with other persons, e.g., the attorney general, or an outside expert." 1961
HmBooK,supra note 18, at 219 (emphasis added). See also Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15
N.J. 498, 514-16, 105 A.2d 545, 554-55 (1954), discussed in 2 F. COOPmt, supra note
8, at 439-40 ("[Ilt is a basic requirement of fair procedure as applicable to administrative adjudication as to proceedings in the courts--that nothing should be taken into account in arriving at a decision on a contested issue of fact that has not been introduced
into the record and exposed to refutation or explanation by the parties."). This principle has not been strictly enforced in North Carolina case law. For example, in State
ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Town of Scotland Neck, 243 N.C. 193, 90 S.E.2d 519
(1955), the court held that private consultations, following a rntemaking hearing, by the
decisionmaker with representatives of a power company that was a party to the proceeding, while unfortunate, did not result in prejudicial error.
268. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-35 (Supp. 1974).
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decisionmaker be personally familiar with the record, 2oa the factual
findings be based exclusively upon the evidence and matters officially
noticed, the entire record be considered, the decision be supported by
substantial evidence as defined in the Act, and the decision be tendered
to the party, and his attorney of record, if any. 70
In substance, section 36 is a follow-up provision to section 35. It
will be recalled that section 35, in general, provides that matters not
in the record may not affect -the decision. Section 36 expands upon
this by requiring that the decision be based upon the record evidence
(or evidentiary substitutes, for example, stipulations under section 31).
It should be emphasized that when the ultimate decisionmaker is someone other than the person or persons who have heard the evidence, section 36 is particularly important. It requires a review "of -the official
record." By requiring not merely that the evidence be the exclusive
basis for findings of fact, section 36 is further designated to limit
the possibility of unfair or arbitrary decisions, by requiring that the
decisionmaker articulate the findings of fact, that these be based
upon the evidence, and be supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore by requiring that decisions ,be served upon the parties, decisionmakers are on notice that not merely the decision, but the basis for
the decision is likely to be scrutinized by affected parties. This inherently reduces the possibility for administrative arbitrariness. 2
(iv)

Record of the hearing

Section 37 sets forth a detailed list of items that shall be prepared by an agency in connection with a hearing, which together
shall constitute the official record. 2 Section 37(b) provides for the
269. The requirements respecting the content of the record are set forth in section
37 and are discussed in note 272 and accompanying text infra.
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-36 (Supp. 1974).
271. The reasons underlying requirements like those of section 36 have been stated
elsewhere as follows:
The obligation to formulate findings, rather than simply to announce a resuit, tends to assure considered action by the administrative deciding officer,
As a corollary, the findings themselves offer some assurance to the parties that
the decision has been arrived at rationally, on the evidence; and the findings
at least enable the parties to judge for themselves the soundness of the decision,
and afford them assistance in deciding whether or not to seek to reverse it on
rehearing or judicial review.
R. BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 253.
272. Official record.-(a) An agency shall prepare an official record of a
hearing which shall include:
(1) Notices, pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings;
(2) Questions and offers of proof, objections, and rulings thereon;
(3) Evidence presented;
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recording of oral testimony.
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It appears that the requirement that

proceedings "shall be recorded" refers to recording in the generic
sense of "to make a record of." Accordingly, it would seem that stenographic notetaking, as well as mechanical recording by electronic
means, would satisfy the recordation requirement. Such record of
oral evidence need not be transcribed unless requested by a party, with
the requesting party bearing the cost of the transcript or portion
thereof requested.
The requirement of an official record is deemed to serve the useful function of preserving the items that have a bearing on an agency
decision. This requirement, in particular, is necessary in order that
judicial review of the decision may be had.
(4) Special Provisions on Licensing
(a) Licensing is a contested case
License is defined broadly by section 2(3) so as to include any
evidence of a right or privilege to engage in a trade, occupation, or
other activity.2 7 3 Licensing is defined as "any administrative action
issuing, failing to issue, suspending or revoking a license. ' '2 7
Con-

'' 5
tested case, in turn, is defined specifically to include "licensing. 27
Accordingly, administrative action issuing, failing to issue, suspending,
or revoking a license is subject to all of the procedural safeguards outlined in connection with the administrative function of determining
contested cases.276
The Act in section 2(3) does contain two exceptions to the definition of license. The exceptions are licenses issued under chapter 20
218
(motor vehicles) 277 and subchapter 1 of chapter 105 (taxation)

(4) Matters officially noticed, except matters so obvious that a statement
of them would serve no useful purpose;
Proposed findings and exceptions; and

Any decision, opinion, order, or report by the officer presiding at the
hearing and by the agency.

(b) Proceedings at which oral evidence is presented shall be recorded, but need

not be transcribed unless requested by a party. Each party shall bear the cost
of the transcript or part thereof or copy of said transcript or part thereof which
said party requests.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-37 (Supp. 1974).

273. Id. § 150A-2(3).
274. Id. § 15GA-2(4).
275. Id. § 105A-2(2).
276. The expansive definition contained in the NC APA of contested case-"any
agency proceeding . . . wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties
are to be determined"--would in itself include administrative action defined by the act
as "licensing." See id. § 150A-2(2).
277. Id. H9 20-1 to -319.2 (Cur. Supp. 1974).
278. Id. §§ 105-2 to -270.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

of the general statutes. The logic of the exemptions for automobile
licenses and revenue franchise licenses is that, when an application
is filed in appropriate form, or alternatively a test has been passed
to which answer correction does not involve discretion, the license
must be issued as a ministerial function, upon payment of the appropriate fee. In such cases neither hearings nor the other procedural protections could serve any useful function.2 19
(b)

Effect of special licensingprovisions

Since licensing (with the exceptions noted) is subject to the procedural protections governing administrative adjudications, the essential inquiry here concerns the effect of the special provisions of section
3.280 The special provisions on licensing add to the requirements governing contested cases in three situations: (1) the renewal or replacement of existing licenses, (2) the termination, modification or suspension of licenses, and (3) the suspension of licenses required by an
emergency.
(i)

Renewal or replacement of existing licenses

When a licensee makes "timely and sufficient application" for
the renewal of an existing license or a new license to replace an existig license, providing any required fee has been paid and the activity
279. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 132; cf. Poole v. Board of Cosmetic Art
Examiners, 221 N.C. 199, 19 S.E.2d 635 (1942).
280. Special provisions on licensing.-(a) When a licensee makes timely
and sufficient application for renewal of a license or a new license (including
the payment of any required license fee) with reference to activity of a continuing nature, the existing license does not expire until a decision on the application is finally made by the agency, and if the application is denied or the terms

of the new license are limited, until the last day for applying for judicial review

of the agency order. This subsection does not affect agency action summarily
suspending such license under subsections (b) and (c)of this section.
(b) Before the commencement of proceedings for suspension, revocation,
annulment, withdrawal, recall, cancellation, or amendment of a license, an
agency shall give notice to the licensee, pursuant to the provisions of G.S.
150A-23 (c), of alleged facts or alleged conduct which warrant the intended action. The licensee shall be given an opportunity to show compliance with all
lawful requirements for retention of the license.
(c) If the agency finds that the public health, safety, or welfare requires
emergency action and incorporates this finding in its order, summary suspension of a license may be ordered effective on the date specified in the order
or on service of the certified copy of the order at the last known address of
the licensee, whichever is later, and effective during the proceedings. The proceedings shall be promptly commenced and determined.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as amending or repealing
any special statutes, in effect prior to July 1, 1975, which provide for the summary suspension of a license.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-3 (Supp. 1974).
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for which the existing license is held is "of a continuing nature," two

special rules apply: first, the existing license does not expire until the
agency renders a final decision; and second, if the application is
denied or the terms of the new license are limited, the existing license
does not expire until the expiration of the period for applying for judi21
cial review of the agency order.

This provision is addressed to instances in which, for example, a
person holding an existing license may have made a substantial investment in the activity permitted by the license and a temporary absence of a license would require the activity licensed to cease. Accordingly, the section is designed to preclude hardship upon an applicant
that would be caused by a lapse of a license between the expiration of
one license, assuming application has been -timely made and is otherwise sufficient, until judicial review is had of the -agency decision re282
garding the issuance of a renewal or replacement license.
(ii)

Termination, modification, or suspension

Section 3(b) provides that "before the commencement of proceedings for suspension, revocation, annulment, withdrawal, recall,
cancellation or amendment" of a license an agency must take two actions: the agency must give notice to the licensee under section 23(c)
28 of alleged facts or alleged conduct which warrant
of the NC APA,
the proceedings being contemplated by the agency; and the agency
must give the licensee an opportunity to show compliance with all
lawful requirements for retention of the license.
Since the proceedings of the character identified in section 3(b)
284
would seem plainly, when initiated, to constitute a contested case
and thus would be subject to the procedural safeguards governing adjudication, it appears that the purpose of section 3(b) is not to replace those basic adjudication requirements, but to specify added pro281. Id. § 150A-3(a). This section, by its terms, does not affect summary suspensions under sections 3(b) and (c). It should be noted that the Act's language provides
for an existing license to continue "until the last day" for applying for judicial review.
The only construction that makes sense is the "expirationof the last day."
282. See 2 F. CooPEr, supra note 8, at 490-91.
283. For a discussion of the requirements of section 23 (c)see text accompanying
notes 196-97 supra.
284. See notes 174-75 and accompanying text supra. It may be recalled that a preliminary investigation to determine whether to initiate a proceeding is not a contested
case; thus the need for this special provision.
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cedural protections prior to the institution of the proceeding specified
285
in 3(b).
(iii)

Suspension required by emergency

Section 3(c) addresses those instances in which the public health,
safety, or welfare requires emergency action. In such instances, if the
agency finds (and incorporates the findings in its order) that the public health, safety, or welfare so requires, summary suspension of a
license may be undertaken. The summary suspension may be effective on a date specified in the order or upon service of a certified copy
of the order at the last known address of the licensee, whichever is
later. This suspension may be effective while proceedings for a termination (or other disposition) are taking place. It should be noted
especially that the Act requires that such proceedings shall be
"promptly" commenced and determined.- 8
V.

A.

JuDIcIAL REviEw: THE ROLES OF AGENCIES AND COURTS

The Premiseof JudicialReview
Judicial review is based on the premise that courts are the final

285. A question might be raised regarding the significance, if any, or the difference
between the actions listed in section 3(b) and the definition of "licensing" contained
in section 2(4). See note 46 supra. While the reason for this difference does not
readily appear, one reason might be that the greater detail in specifying the list of actions in section 3(b) was to call attention to the special opportunity given to holders
of licenses to attempt to show their retention rights prior to the initiation of such actions to effect one of the ends identified. The greater specificity of section 3(b) appears
to be only a more detailed way of saying "issuing, . . . suspending or revoking" a license. Manifestly, an "annulment, withdrawal, recall or cancellation" would be in substance and effect, a "revocation," and the substance and effect is controlling and not
the label placed on the administrative action. Otherwise, by the simple device of failing
to use the words "issuing, suspending or revoking," and the substitution therefor of novel
terms ("termination," "modification," "retrieval"-the list is endless), agencies could
render the licensing provisions nugatory. Similarly, action "amending" a license constitutes a "revocation" to the extent that, and the particulars in which, a "right or privilege
to engage in a trade, occupation, or other activity," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-2(3)
(Supp. 1974), is diminished, and conversely constitutes "action issuing" a license to the
extent that, and the particulars in which, the right or privilege is increased.
Action of an agency which neither diminished nor increased the right or privilege
under a license would not seem to be subject to the requirements of section 3. Examples
would include correction of clerical errors; correcting the identity, e.g., corporate name
and the like, of the licensee.
286. By its terms, section 3(c) does not repeal any special statutes that provide for
sumniary suspension. This savings clause, however, does not apply to chapter 150 of
the North Carolina General Statutes (in existence prior to the effective date of the NC
APA), since the purpose of the Act is in effect to repeal chapter 150. Act of April
12, 1974, ch. 1331, § 1, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 691.
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arbiters of governmental determinations affecting the legal rights, du-

ties, or privileges of specifically named persons.2 8

The judicial re-

view provisions of the NC APA determine the relationships that are
to exist between agencies and courts, specify the respective roles of
courts and agencies in the execution of governmental business, circumscribe the persons who may invoke court process as a check on

agency action, and set out the procedures applicable for invoking
court process.288

The issue of proper allocation of functions and roles

is difficult Nevertheless, for purposes of analysis, it is possible conceptually to separate the basic problems into three general areas:
(1) the availability of judicial process to control agency action; (2)
the manner in which court control may be sought, and (3) the nature
of judicial control, the manner in which it is exercised, and the limitations upon it.
B.

Availability of JudicialReview
The NC APA contains two provisions regarding the availability of

287. This generalization is a substantial oversimplification of this very difficult topic
and is subject to many exceptions. See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 214, at 87-120.
The general conclusion stated derives from limitations expressed in article IH of the
United States Constitution and in state constitutions, e.g., N.C. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1, that
the judicial power is vested in courts. However, the North Carolina constitution also
specifically contemplates that administrative agencies, in certain instances, may be vested
with judicial powers, without thus constituting them constituent parts of the judiciary.
Utilities Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 142 S.E.2d 8 (1964).
N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 3, provides: "Judicial powers of administrative agencies. The
General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies established pursuant to law such
judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment
of the purposes for which the agencies were created. Appeals from administrative agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice." See also note 215 supra.
288. The judicial review provisions contained in the NC APA are to a large extent
a reenactment of, and in some instances in substance identical to, the North Carolina
judicial review provisions first enacted in 1953. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316
(1974), repealed, Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1331, § 2, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 691,
703. Accordingly, since courts, lawyers, and agencies will be familiar with many judicial review concepts and problems, the discussion of judicial review herein will contain
less detailed analysis than the preceding discussion. In addition, several authors have
already examined aspects of the judicial review question in North Carolina. No attempt
will be made to examine general problems sufficiently examined elsewhere. See Hanft,
supra note 224; A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L.
REv. 375, 378 (1953); Note, ProceduralDue Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings, 43 N.C.L. Ruv. 152 (1964); Note, 42 N.C.L. REv. 601 (1964).
Also it should be noted that in the early 1950's a Special Commission was created
by the General Assembly to study state administrative procedure. In 1953 that Commission issued a report that, among other things, proposed the judicial review provisions
contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1974), repealed, Act of April 12,
1974, ch. 1331, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 691, 703. REPoRT oF TE SPEcAL COMMIssION
TO STUDY PRAcCncEs AND PRocEDUREs BEFORE STATE ADMINsTRATIVE AGENCIES 20-24
(1953).
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the judicial process as a control upon action of administrative agencies. Section 43 governs the availability of general judicial review of
agency decisions on their merits. 289 Since general judicial review under section 43 is available only with respect to a "final agency decision,"290 it can be imagined that, in the absence of some provision
whereby the prompt rendering of a final decision could be required,
general judicial review could be forestalled simply by an agency's delay in making a final decision or refusal to render it. Section 44 is addressed to such an eventuality. This section provides that a person
whose rights, duties or privileges are adversely affected by an agency's
unreasonable delay in reaching a final decision may seek a court order compelling 'action by the agency.29 1
Turning now to general judicial review, a petitioner must satisfy
five requirements specified in section 43 in order to obtain judicial review under the NC APA: (1) the petitioner must be a "person aggrieved;" (2) the decision of which review is sought must be a "final
agency decision;" (3) the decision must have been made "in a contested case; '2 2 (4) the petitioner must have "exhausted all adminis289. Right to judicial review.-Any person who is aggrieved by a final
agency decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative
remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to jadicial
review of such decision under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by some other statute, in which case the review shall
be under such other statute. Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any person
from invoking any judicial remedy available to him under the law to test the
validity of any administrative action not made reviewable under this Article.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (Supp. 1974).
290. For a discussion of the import of this limitation see text accompanying notes
311-14 infra.
291. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-44 (Supp. 1974). With the exception of the deletion

of the word "administrative" between "final" and "decision," which effects no substantive change, the quoted provision is identical to the provision contained in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-308 (1974), repealed, Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1331, (1973] N.C.
Sess. Laws 691, 703. Although this provision does not, in terms, contain an authorization for the court to act, it appears that a party seeking an order compelling a decision
when it is unreasonably withheld should not need to cite any specific authorization for
court action outside of section 44 itself. It does contain a manageable standard-"unreasonable' delay-that a court can employ, and since the action appears to sound in
equity the court should be deemed empowered to grant appropriate relief-generally an
order requiring the agency to reach a decision. This interpretation will avoid the
vagaries of mandamus practice. See generally 2 F. CooPEa, supra note 8, at 653-59;
3 DAvis, TRFATsE, supra note 76, § 24.03. It also avoids the limitations on injunction
practice. See generally D. Donns, HANDBoox ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 2.10, at 10812 (1973). Even if, however, the court should refer to mandamus or mandatory injunction precedents, it seems reasonably clear that the making of a final decision-some decision-can be compelled as a clear duty imposed on the agency by law, cf. Board of
Managers of Walker Memorial Hosp. v. City of Wilmington, 235 N.C. 597, 70 S.E.2d
833 (1952); Ornoff v. City of Durham, 221 N.C. 457, 20 S.E.2d 380 (1942), even if
the compelling of a particular decision would not be possible.
292. This provision must be read in conformity with other specific provisions. It
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trative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule;" and
(5) there must not be "adequate" judicial review provided by "some
293
other statute.
(1)

Adequacy of Judicial Review Under Other Statutes

Considering the last requirement first, since it represents a
-threshold to the availability of judicial review under the Act, it must
be noted that one of the major shortcomings of the NC APA, as well as
its predecessor, is the limitation of judicial review under the Act to
those instances in which "adequate?' procedure of judicial review is not
available under some other statute and the affirmative requirement
that if adequate judicial review is available under another statute, it
must be sought under the other statute. 291

It has been noted else-

where that North Carolina statutes contain a "needless variety" of judicial review statutes. 29 5 Unfortunately, the NC APA perpetuates this
297
needless variety 290 with its serious adverse effect upon uniformity.
Excessive lack of uniformity requires members of the bar to become familiar with an agency's individual judicial review provisions,
at least in order to ascertain that an agency's enabling act does not
contain any judicial review provisions 298 or to make the more difficult
determination of whether an agency's judicial review provisions are
will be recalled that section 16 provides for judicial review of the denial of a petition for
adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule, see text accompanying notes 152-54 supra; and
that section 17 provides for judicial review in connection with declaratory rulings, see
text accompanying notes 168-70 supra.
293. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (Supp. 1974).
294. The only other statute to which the requirement could reasonably refer is the
particular agency's enabling act or other organic statute specifying the particular agency's powers, duties, or responsibilities when a decision has been rendered respecting the
powers specified in such organic act.
295. Hanft, supra note 224, at 819.
296. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.3 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (Commissioner of Insurance); id. § 84-28 (1965) (Board of Law Examiners); id. §§ 90-14.1 to .12 (Board
of Medical Examiners); id. § 136-29 (1974) (Board of Transportation); id. §§ 143214.4, .5 (Board of Water and Air Resources). See also id. § 18A-44 (Supp. 1974)
(ABC Board); id. § 53-92 (1965) (Banking Commission).
297. Some differences, based upon individual agency needs, might be warranted, although it is not easy to imagine many such instances. A detailed agency-by-agency
study is needed to determine agency requirements as to judicial review with an eye
toward providing a basis for determining when, in respect to a particular agency, special,
nonuniform requirements are warranted.
298. The absence of judicial review provisions in an agency's enabling legislation
entitles an aggrieved person to review under the NC APA, notwithstanding that alternative nonstatutory (or "common law") review might be available. This is so since, by
its terms, section 43 entities one to judicial review under the NC APA unless adequate
procedure for judicial review is provided by some other "statute."
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"adequate."299 Individual judicial review provisions are contained
in scattered sections of the General Statutes.8 0 The applicability of
judicial precedents interpreting an individual statute to other individ-

ual statutes is problematic, thus adding to uncertainty as to individual
rights and duties as well as agency responsibilities.

01

What is the test for determining whether "adequate procedures
for judicial review is provided by some other statute?" In Jarrell v.
Board of Adjustment 30 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court held, under

the predecessor general judicial review statute, 08 that judicial review
provided by another statute is adequate "only if the scope of review is
equal to that under" the general statute. This holding has been seen
as meaning that "the general judicial review statute provides the minimum scope of judicial review."80 4 However, the proposition should
not be understood as limited to "scope of judicial review" in its restricted sense, but as applicable generally to issues of judicial review
in the broader sense.805 Accordingly, the NC APA should be regarded
as setting the minimum standards and requirements with respect to judicial review generally.10 6
299. See text accompanying notes 302-06 infra.
300. See provisions cited in note 296 supra.
301. Fortunately the problem can be easily remedied in the future by legislation repealing judicial review provisions contained in individual statutes. This is strongly recommended.
302. 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
303. See note 288 supra. This holding seems applicable by analogy to the NC
APA.
304. Hanft, supra note 224, at 819.
305. Professor Hanft's later formulation of the proposition seems to have reached
this conclusion. "Put otherwise, this [general judicial review] statute provides the minimum judicial review for decisions of state ...

administrative agencies." Id. at 644. It

should be noted that Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879
(1963), held the predecessor general judicial review statute applicable to a municipal
agency. The prior statute did not contain an exemption from its coverage for municipal
(or other local) bodies, whereas the NC APA, in section 2(1), expressly exempts, inter
alia, municipal corporations from coverage. For a discussion of the exemptions from
coverage of the NC APA see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
306. One problem which merits further attention is whether all the provisions of the
NC APA replace another judicial review statute even though the other statute is inadequate only in one or more particular aspects and not in its entirety. Put differently,
can another judicial review statute be "partially inadequate" or, conversely, if one aspect
of another statute is inadequate, do the adequate parts continue to be applicable or may
one proceed entirely under the NC APA? It would be infinitely preferable to conclude
as a policy judgment that if another statute is inadequate in any aspect, judicial review
may be had under the NC APA in its entirety. Cf. Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment,
258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963). This would greatly simplify matters. On the
other hand, it is not unreasonable to argue that the NC APA's provisions are applicable
only to the extent that another statute is inadequate. On balance the better interpretation of the NC APA's language, and analysis of the policies, leads this writer to conclude
that inadequacy in any respect (determined by reference to NC APA's provisions as the
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(2)

Person Aggrieved

Turning now to the minimum provisions for judicial review, the
first requirement of the NC APA is that a petitioner for judicial review
of an agency decision be a "person who is aggrieved" by the decision
of which review is sought. This is the provision that determines the
30 7
"standing" of a person to invoke judicial review.
Section 2(6) provides that a "person aggrieved" is "any person,
firm, corporation, or group of persons of common interest who are direotly or indirectly affected substantially in their person, property,
or public office or employment by an agency decision."
Under the predecessor judicial review statute, which employed the
identical phrase "person who is aggrieved," but unlike the NC APA,
did not contain a definition of it, -the North Carolina Supreme Court
gave an expansive and sensitive interpretation to the requirement. In
In re Halifax PaperCo. 0 8 the court stated:
The expression "person aggrieved" has no technical meaning.
What it means depends on the circumstances involved. It has
been variously defined: "adversely or injuriously affected; damnifled, having a grievance, having suffered a loss or injury, or injured; also having cause for complaint. More specifically the
word(s) may be employed meaning adversely affected in respect
of legal rights, or suffering from an infringement or denial of le30 9
gal rights.
This interpretation does not seem in substance at variance with
the later statutory definition. Thus, the NC APA's definition should be
seen as simply a different way of stating the substance and effect of a
formulation reached by the courts prior to its enactment.31 0
minimum standards) should lead to the applicability of the general statute and the inapplicability of the other statute.
At this point, however, a problem arises as to individual judicial review statutes that
provide "specific provisions to the contrary of the NC APA," see text accompanying
notes 35-39 supra, in which case the NC APA itself does not apply. To effectuate all
parts of the Act it will be necessary to distinguish between a statute which is "inadequate," and one that provides "a specific provision to the contrary." An individual statute that does not contain provisions on one or more aspects of judicial review would
be inadequate. But a statute that contained a provision in conflict with the NC APA,
and that was otherwise adequate, would be applicable, and the NC APA would not apply
to the extent the provisions were in conflict.
307. See generally 2 F. Coopra, supra note 8, at 535-59; 3 DAvis, TREATiSE, supra

note 67, §§ 22.01-.18.
308. 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).
309. Id. at 595, 131 S.E.2d at 446, quoting 3 CLS. Aggrieved (1973).
310. The requirement in the definition of the NC APA that there be "substantial"
effect appears to be a manner of providing that no judicial review may be had when
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(3) Final Agency Decision
The requirement that an agency's decision be final, as a prerequisite to judicial review, is an implementation of a general policy against
piecemeal judicial involvement in agency processes. This policy is
designed to conserve judicial resources, avoid delay that would be occasioned by premature judicial intervention, and prevent judicial intervention when agency action has not "crystalized" into a settled or
"ripe" controversy, but remains "hypothetical, intermediate, provisional,
or preliminary."
The requirement of finality is not, however, an absolute bar to
judicial review prior to an agency's rendering of an ultimate decision
on an entire controversy. This is so since an agency's determination
of some particular issue within an overall controversy may settle or
"fix" the rights of a party with respect to the controverted issue and
have a substantial adverse effect on the party pending resolution of
ultimate controversy, even though other issues remain outstanding.
Accordingly, in some instances, judicial review of an agency order
which finally settles an issue should be available to avoid hardship
and unnecessary litigation and expense.
For example, an agency may make a determination that an immediate suspension of a person's license is required under section 3(c)
on the grounds that "the public health, safety or welfare requires
emergency action" with the suspension effective immediately. Thereafter the agency may initiate a contested proceeding to revoke or cancel the license. Although at a time subsequent to a hearing the
agency may decide that no revocation or cancellation is warranted,
an asserted effect is merely de minimus. It is difficult to imagine any interest which
could be affected in ways which were greater than de minimus when in legal contemplation that effect would not be regarded as "substantial." The real test of substantiality,
when viewed in this light, is whether the matter presented is worthy of judicial inquiry.
If it is not, it is de minimus and the effect, if any, is damnum absque injuria. Similarly,
the requirement that one be affected in his "person" or "property" seems to include every
kind of injury that can be experienced which is judicially cognizable, with the terms
"public office" or "employment" provided only for emphasis. For example an effect on
one's health, well-being, or living environment is an effect on one's "person" in any real
sense of the term "person." Thus, an effect on one's person would not seem to be limited
to corporal or physical effect, but any effect perceived through the body's sensory
organs. For example, the common law of nuisance long has recognized that the emitting
of noxious odors, which do no more than provide a sensory assault on the olfactory
organs, can be harm worthy of judicial inquiry. Cf. W. PRossER, HANDBoo OF THE
LAw oF ToRTs § 88, at 584 n.46 (4th ed. 1971). All nonpersonal "effects" which are
judicially cognizable are broadly classifiable as "property." See, e.g., Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALF LJ. 733 (1964). See also Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir,
1973).
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the licensee may suffer irreparable harm during the pendency of the

revocation proceeding, while the license is suspended. In this circumstance is the agency's suspension determination a "final order," notwithstanding its arguably "provisionar' character? It would appear
that the order may constitute a final decision with respect to whether
the public health, safety, or welfare requires the suspension. 1 '

In in-

stances in which a party would be substantially or irreparably harmed
by the order, when the party asserts a good faith and nonfrivolous
claim that the agency is proceeding in excess of its authority, or with-

out jurisdiction, and similar instances, immediate judicial review may
be necessary to avoid injustice."'

Similarly, immediate judicial review may be necessary when an
agency's determination of a question of law or statutory provision in a
contested case proceeding is dispositive, for example, of an issue of
jurisdiction,313 power or authority to initiate a contested case proceeding, or when a appellate tribunal of an agency makes such a determi-

nation, but remands within the agency (for example, to a hearing officer) for further proceedings.

In such cases the order should be

treated as final as to the issue raised. However, to avoid unnecessary fragmentation of administrative proceedings, it nevertheless may
become necessary to balance the harm, burden, or inconvenience to a
party that will be caused by a denial of immediate review against the
interests advanced by the finality requirement.3 1 4 Orders that for lack
311. The test is not easy to apply in particular cases. Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), with Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970) (en bane).
312. There are notable exceptions in which finality has not been found even in face
of claims of nonjurisdiction, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41
(1938).
313. See, e.g., Airline Ground Serv., Inc. v. Checker Cab Co., 151 Neb. 837, 39
N.W.2d 809 (1949).
314. Courts, under various statutory formulations, seem to have been employing
such a practical interpretation in the context of a policy analysis, such as above suggested. Under its certiorari procedure, the Florida Supreme Court held that an order
of the Industrial Commission remanding a proceeding to a hearing officer possessed
"sufficient finality to be entitled to review. . . because if left standing it would conclude
one or more elements 'of the case." Sterling Equip. Mfg. Corp. v. May, 1,44 So. 2d 305
(Fla. 1962). In the absence of some manifest need for immediate review, courts have
generally denied review when an appellate tribunal of an agency remands for further
proceedings. 2 F. CoOPER, supra note 8, at 589. The Nebraska Supreme Court, by way
of dictum, has quoted with approval the statement made in CBS v. United States, 316
U.S. 407, 425 (1942), that "'[tjhe ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in
any overrefined technique, but in the need to review to protect from irreparable injury
threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings that attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may follow.'" Airlines Ground Serv., Inc. v. Checker Cab Co., 151 Neb. 837, 840, 39 N.W.2d
809, 811 (1949).
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of finality are not immediately reviewable are, of course, reviewable
as part of a final order subsequently issued as a product of the proceeding.
(4) Contested Cases and Rulemaking
The effect of the limitation on judicial review to a person aggrieved by a final agency decision "in a contested case" is to avoid the
confusing problems created by application of the "ripeness doctrine" '
to pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules or rulemaking,a1°
but without impairing the basic functions of judicial review.
It will be recalled that the Act defines contested case as "any
agency proceeding. . . wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of
specific parties are to be determined. 31 7 The definition thus limits
the type of agency determinations that are subject to general judicial
review.
The availability of judicial review of rules and rulemaking under
the Act is determined in two ways. First, a person aggrieved 1 s by an
agency's promulgation of a rule must request an agency declaratory
ruling under section 17.819 If a declaratory ruling is issued, or no
ruling is issued within sixty days after request, judicial review is available under the Act in the same manner as a final order in a contested
case.82 0 Second, a person who wishes an agency to adopt, amend,
or repeal a rule, may petition the agency for such action. Denial of
to
the petition is subject to judicial review under the Act, but is limited
821
discretion.
of
abuse
an
constitutes
denial
the
whether
of
the issue
(5)

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Basic policies are advanced by the exhaustion requirement.
They include an interest in orderly procedure generally, efficient allocation between agencies and courts of governmental business, assurance that the agency's opportunity to correct an asserted error is ade315. See generally 3 DAvis, TREATSE, supra note 67, §§ 21.01-.10.
316. Although "ripeness" issues may arise in contexts other than rulemaking, id.,
other specific provisions of the Act with respect to judicial review, discussed textually
hereinafter, eliminate ripeness determinations as a significant problem under the Act.
317. For a discussion of this definition see text accompanying notes 174-84 supra.
318. For a discussion of "person aggrieved" see text accompanying notes 307-10
supra.
319. See text accompanying notes 155-70 supra.
320. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-17 (Supp. 1974). But see discussion of scope of review in text accompanying notes 406-11 infra.
321. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-16 (Supp. 1974).
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quate, and an opportunity for agencies to apply any relevant special
experience and competence to a matter prior to judicial intervention.822 The policies are implemented in the NC APA by restriction of
judicial review to a petitioner "who has exhausted all administrative

remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule." 328 Since
the requirement of exhaustion under the Act is limited to remedies

made available by "statutes or agency rule," a petitioner need canvass only the agency's relevant enabling statute and published agency
rules, and pursue any remedies therein provided. 824
In view of the blanket statutory command requiring "exhaustion,"
it should be pointed out that the exhaustion doctrine originated as a

court-created rule of self limitation. 25 A subsequent general statutory
formulation should be interpreted with reference to its common law
background. 26 Moreover, it should be noted that although courts variously refer to exhaustion as "well-established" or a "cardinal principle,"3 27 the doctrine as late as 1965 apparently had found statutory
expression in general judicial review statutes of only three states. 28
The original Model State APA did not require exhaustion, with the
exhaustion requirement having been added in the Revised Model
State APA. 32 9 In the federal courts the doctrine predates the Federal

APA.88 0

322. See generally 2 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 572-74; 3 DAvis, TREATsE, supra

note 67, § 20.01-.10.
323. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (Supp. 1974).

324. This eliminates pursuing informal procedures, or attempting to ascertain
whether avenues exist outside those provided in formal published agency rules.
325. 2 F. CooPER,supra note 8,at 573.
326. This is particularly important where, as in the NC APA, the doctrine is generally incorporated, but without any specific reference to the numerous judicially created
exceptions, the purpose of which is the avoidance of manifest injustice. See 2 F.
COOPER, supra note 8, at 577-81.
327. 2 AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 595 (1962).
328. 2 F. CoopER, supra note 76, at 574. Even at this writing research reveals only
twelve states that require exhaustion in general terms in statutes governing judicial review. In addition to the North Carolina statute these statutes are: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 4-183 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-120 (Supp. 1974); [DAHO CODE §
67-5215 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A-19 (to be effective July 1, 1975); MIcir. STAT.
ANN. § 3.560(201) (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.100 (Vernon 1953); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 82-4216 (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.§ 42-35-15 (1969);
S.D. CoMPiLED LAws ANN. § 1-26-30 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 815 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276.32 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
329. REvisEn MODEL STATE APA § 15(a) (1970 version); 1961 HANDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 220.
330. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). The Federal
APA, which does not, in terms, contain an exhaustion requirement, was enacted in 1946.
Similarly the doctrine in North Carolina was judicially imposed prior to the general judicial review statute (enacted in 1953). See Warren v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 223
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In view of the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that courts impose the exhaustion requirement as a prerequisite to judicial review
under administrative procedure acts, even though the acts are silent
on the exhaustion requirement. 8 3 ' Conversely at least the Michigan
intermediate appellate courts, without mentioning that state's APA, have
held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when it
would be a "vain and useless"3 2 act or require "useless effort"8 813 notwithstanding the general requirements of exhaustion imposed by the
Michigan APA.134 This perhaps explains why Professor Davis, in a
discussion primarily related to federal requirements of exhaustion,
without referring to statutes at all, could assert that "[n]o court requires exhaustion when exhaustion will involve irreparable injury and
when the agency is palpably without jurisdiction; probably every court
requires exhaustion when the question presented is one within the
agency's specialization and when the administrative remedy is as likely
' 8 Accordingly, the
as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief."83
requirement of exhaustion in the NC APA should not be interpreted as
absolute or inflexible, either because the concept itself is not absolute, or because a general statutory formulation represents a codification of prior common-law interpretations that contain a number of exceptions designed to avoid manifest injustice.8 38
The cases demonstrate that courts have been employing a practical, flexible formula in deciding exhaustion issues. Although not easy
N.C. 843, 28 S.E.2d 505 (1944); cf. Ballard v. City of Charlotte, 235 N.C. 484, 70
S.E.2d 575 (1952).
331. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11523 (West Supp. 1974); A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State,
238 Cal. App. 2d 736, 48 Cal. Rptr. 225 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Woodard v. Broadway Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 2d 218, 244 P.2d 467 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1952); Weaver v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 54 Cal. App. 2d 777, 129 P.2d 730
(2d Dist. Ct. App. 1942); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.30-.31 (1974); Pest Control Comm.
v. Ace Pest Control, Inc., 214 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1968).
332. Sterling Secret Serv. v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 20 Mich. App. 502, 174
N.W.2d 298 (1969).
333. Welfare Employees Union v. Michigan Civil Serv. Comm'n, 28 Mich. App.
343, 184 N.W.2d 247 (1970).
334. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(201) (Supp. 1974); cf. Trever v. City of Sterling
Heights, 37 Mich. App. 594, 195 N.W.2d 91 (1972).
335. 3 DAvis, TREATISE, supra note 67, § 20.01, at 56. Professor Davis proposes
a balancing formula: "extent of injury from pursuit of administrative remedy, degree
of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and involvement of
specialized administrative understanding in the question of jurisdiction." Id. § 20.03, at
69.
336. The only statutory requirement that has been found as to which the foregoing
statement would be unnecessary is that of Iowa, which requires exhaustion of only
"adequate" administrative remedies. IowA CODn ANN. § 17A-19 (effective July 1,
1975).
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in application, an exception to the exhaustion requirement has been

found if a petitioner makes a compelling showing that the agency has
no jurisdiction to act in the matter submitted for review. s 7 Careful
scrutiny is necessary, however, since much more than a conclusory
allegation of lack of jurisdiction is required."" 8 Similarly, a failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should not bar judicial review if a
petitioner makes a good faith, nonfrivolous, facial constitutional challenge to the legislation under which the agency is proceeding. This is

so since in the usual case an agency is not empowered to declare its
own enabling statute unconstitutional, and hence any proceedings before the agency prior to settling the constitutional issue would necessarily be useless in determining constitutionality."" 9
Finally there exist two related, and very difficult "catchall" exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: (1) that the administrative
remedy be inadequate to avoid irreparable injury; and (2) that exhaustion would be a useless or futile act. No rule is discernable from
case law.840 With respect to inadequacy of -the administrative remedy
and avoidance of irreparable injury, a failure to exhaust may be excused when the agency has no power to grant remedies to which the
petitioner would be entitled if it prevailed in court, 4 1 when exhaustion
would raise -thespectre of a multiplicity of suits, 42 when the proceeding
itself would cause irreparable injury,"' and when there: existed a
44
threat of disclosure of confidential information.
337. Los Angeles County v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d
41 (1953); Ward v. Keenan, 3 NJ. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949). In the federal courts,
see, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
338. See Miller v. Schrunk, 232 Ore. 383, 375 P.2d 823 (1962).
339. Authority on the question is sparse, perhaps because the proposition sits on its
own bottom of logic. Agencies are creatures for carrying out the legislative will, and
a declaration of unconstitutionality of its enabling legislation would represent the ultimate frustration of that will. See 2 F. CooPin, supra note 8, at 579; 3 DAvis, TRATISE,
supra note 67, § 20.01, at 74.
340. See generally 2 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 579-81; 3 DAvis, 'mATISE, supra
note 67, §§ 20.05, .07.
341. Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Weiss, 113 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1959) (complaint to
Civil Aeronautics Board not required since the agency would not have power inter alia
to order a local county airport authority to make reparation of alleged discriminatory
rates charged, nor to issue temporary injunction).
342. Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, 386 Pa. 306, 125 A.2d
755 (1956).

343. No case has been found in which a court squarely so held, but this proposition
was discussed in Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) (where it was
alleged that the proceeding before the agency would impair bank credit). But see
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (litigation expenses insufficient to excuse exhaustion requirement).
344. Cf. Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939).
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As to futility of exhaustion, although a prior indication of adverse decision is generally not sufficient to excuse the exhaustion requirement, the requirement has not been imposed, principally in zoning cases, when the court was convinced that the 4exhaustion would be
useless because of prior agency decisions or action.8 5
All of the exceptions to exhaustion seem to be based upon balancing the needs for immediate judicial relief to avoid injustice against the
interests advanced by requiring the matter to proceed through the full
agency process. With these considerations in view, each instance necessarily must turn upon its particular facts, with the petitioner who
seeks to avoid the exhaustion requirement, perhaps, under a burden to
make a compelling case.
C. Petitioningfor JudicialReview
(1)

The Petition-Time, Place, Manner and Content

Section 45 governs the manner and time of seeking judicial review. 46 It provides -that a petition shall be filed in Superior Court of
Wake County, except when an original determination in the matter
was made by a local agency or local board, and thereafter appealed
to the state board, in which case the petition may be filed in the superior court of the county where the original determination was made.
A petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days after a
written copy of the decision is served upon the petitioner, by personal
service or by registered mail. The Act provides that failure to file a
petition within thirty days shall operate as a waiver of a right to judicial review under the Act, but upon a showing of good cause, the superior court may permit judicial review notwithstanding a waiver by
reason of a failure to petition timely for review.
Section 46 governs the content of a petition, and provides that the
petition "shall explicitly state what exceptions are taken to the decision or procedure of the agency and what relief the petitioner seeks."
Thereafter, the petitioner must serve the petition on the agency that
rendered the decision as well as all parties of record by personal service or registered mail. A party served may notify the court of an intention to become a party to the judicial review proceeding within ten
345. Herman v. Village of Hillside, 15 II. 2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1958). See also
Trojan v. Township of Taylor, 352 Mich. 636, 91 N.W.2d 9 (1958); State ex rel. Killern
Realty Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 160 N.E.2d 1 (1959).
346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-45 (Supp. 1974).
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days after receipt of the petition, and thereby may become a party.
Moreover, any person aggrieved may petition to become a party by
filing a motion to intervene as provided in rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.3 47
(2) The Record on Judicial Review
Section 47 provides that "[w]ithin 30 days after receipt of the
copy of the petition for review, or within such additional time as the
court may allow, the .agency shall transmit to the reviewing court...
the entire -record of the proceedings under review. ''s 4u The content of
the record is specified in section 37.49 Under section 47, when the
court permits, the parties by stipulation may shorten the record. Any
party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be
charged by the court for costs occasioned by the refusal.850
(3)

Effect of Agency Decision Pending Review

Section 48 provides that at any time before or during a judicial review proceeding, a person aggrieved may apply to the reviewing court
for an order staying the operation of the agency decision pending the
outcome of -thereview. The court's grant or denial of a stay, however,
is in its discretion, subject to rule 65 of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, 51 for which the basic requirements have been judi52
cially developed.
(4) New Evidence
Section 49 provides for the taking of new evidence after a petition for review has been filed. The party to the review proceeding
must satisfy the court of three conditions: (1) that the new evidence is
material to the issues, (2) that it is not merely cumulative, and (3)
that it could not reasonably have been presented at the hearing before
the agency. If the showing is satisfactory the court "may" remand the
347. Id. § 150A-46. For a definition of "any person aggrieved" see text accompanying notes 307-10 supra. Rule 24 is discussed in text accompanying note 198 supra.
348. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-47 (Supp. 1974).
349. See note 272 and accompanying text supra.
350. An analogous provision may be found in the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provide for taxing certain expenses against a party who refuses to admit, on discovery, a matter subsequently proved. N.C.R. Civ. P. 37(c).
351. N.C. GuN. STAT. § 150A-48 (Supp. 1974).
352. See generally 7 J.MooRn, FEDERAL PRAcTcE
65.04[2], at 65-47 (2d ed.
1974).
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case to the agency for the taking of additional evidence. s8" The use
of the permissive term "may" is addressed to the court's discretion
to remand, and not to the court's power to take evidence itself.8 4
Upon remand and the taking of new evidence, the agency is empowered to affirm or modify its findings of fact and its decision, based on
such new evidence. The new findings and decision shall then be
filed with the reviewing court as part of the record.
D.

The Nature of JudicialReview

The provisions of the Act governing court review of agency action are the critical provisions that determine the appropriate respective -roles of courts and agencies. The overall objective of these provisions is preservation of the vital functions that judicial review serves
in our system of laws and government, while simultaneously according proper respect to agencies as organs of government.
(1) Review Limited to Administrative Record; Exceptions
Section 50 limits the courts on judicial review of agency action
to review of the record made in the agency, s "5 with two exceptions."10
The relationship established between the courts and the agencies, in
a judicial review context, is in many ways analogous to that which
exists between appellate and lower courts. The reviewing court reviews without a jury and, with the exceptions hereinafter noted, "shall
take no evidence not offered at the hearing. '' s The court, however,
353. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-49 (Supp. 1974).
354. When read in conjunction with section 50, this interpretation of section 49 is
compelled, since section 50 prohibits the court from taking any evidence not offered at
the hearing before the agency, with two exceptions. See text accompanying notes 35559 intra.
355. For discussion of the contents of the record see note 272 and accompanying
text supra.
356. See text accompanying notes 357-58 infra.
357. The phrasing of the prohibition against the taking of evidence is possibly ambiguous, and certainly awkward. The phrase "shall take no evidence not offered at the
hearing" could be construed to mean that the reviewing court could "take evidence," in
the sense of a hearing de novo, that "had been offered" at the hearing, for example,
by examining witnesses who testified at the hearing. But this cannot be a proper reading of the phrase: First, read together with the provisions specifying when evidence
(e.g., testimony) may be taken, the inference is that review of the record does not include taking any testimony or evidence; second, taking the same testimony on judicial
review that had been taken below would do serious violence to the basic premises of
review; and, third, such a reading would render senseless other provisions of the Act,
most notably section 37(b) which requires that "plroceedings at which oral evidence
is presented shall be recorded." For these reasons the section really means shall not
"review" any evidence not offered at the hearing and thereby made a part of the record.
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"shall hear oral arguments and receive written briefs."
The -two exceptions in which review is not limited to the record are
instances of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency that
do not appear in the record, and cases in which no record was made
of the proceeding or the record made is inadequate. In cases of alleged procedural irregularity, the Act provides simply that "testimony
may be taken by the court." This therefore grants to the reviewing
judge discretion to take testimony. 5 8 But what factors should guide
the exercise of such discretion and what alternatives, if any, are available to the judge? Reading section 50 in light of section 51, which
specifies actions a reviewing court may take, at least the alternative
of remanding to the agency for the making of a record is available.3 59
In exercising discretion the judge should balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the alternatives based on the particular facts and
circumstances-including delay, consumption of judicial time, and
burden on the petitioner of pursuing the alternatives. When, however,
the alleged procedural irregularity affects the integrity of the agency
factfinding process or vitiates the agency's capacity to make a sufficient record, the reviewing court should take testimony itself.
With respect to a nonexistent or inadequate record, the Act expressly provides that the judge in his discretion may hear all or part
of the matter de novo. Similar considerations seem applicable here
as discussed above in connection with alleged procedural irregularities.
(2)

The Scope of Judicial Review

Of all the problems in administrative law, perhaps none is more
difficult of resolution than determining the standards by which judicial
control of administrative action is to be exercised. Section. 51, which
specifies the scope of review, addresses this problem. The Act specifies four dispositions the court may make of an agency decision:
affirm, remand for further proceedings, reverse, or modify . 60 The
court's power to affirm or remand is not specifically circumscribed.
However, this power should be read as an alternative to the power to
reverse or modify, which is substantially circumscribed. To reverse
or modify the court must find:
(a) that the petitioner's substantial rights,
358. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-50 (Supp. 1974).
359. Section 51 is discussed in text accompanying notes 360-61 infra.
360. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (Supp. 1974).
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(b) "may have" been prejudiced,
(c) by agency findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions which
are
(1) in violation of the constitutional provisions,
(2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency,
(3) made upon unlawful procedure,
(4) affected by other error of law,
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under
the Act, in view of the entire record submitted, or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.8 61
Moreover, if the court reverses or modifies the decision under the
above limitations, it must set out in writing the reasons for the action.
Read together, the requirements that there exist "substantial
rights" that "may have been prejudiced" mean that court intervention
into agency process is not a matter to be taken lightly. Insubstantial
and purely technical or formal rights are clearly subject to a "harmless error" construction. However, a petitioner does not have to demonstrate that substantial rights were prejudiced, but that the action
complained of raises such a significant risk of prejudice to the petitioner that court intrusion into the agency's decisionmaking process is
warranted. 02
We turn now to the six criteria that circumscribe judicial control
of agency action.
(a) Violation of the Constitution
If a petitioner on judicial review alleges that agency action is "in
violation of constitutional provisions," the petitioner could be complaining of three different violations: (1) if the complaint concerns
action the agency is specifically authorized to take under a statute, the
real challenge is to the statute insofar as it authorizes the action; (2)
where the agency has taken action under a general grant of power,
and the complaint is that the agency has undertaken the action in an
361. Id.
362. Contrast the nature of the demonstration necessary under the standard that
agency action "may have prejudiced" substantial rights with one that required a demonstration that agency action "has prejudiced" substantial rights. The distinction seems
plainly to lie in the difference between a risk or probability as opposed to a certainty
or "fact." See generally 2 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 663-64.
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unconstitutional way or has unconstitutionally affected the peti-

tioner, the challenge is not to the statute, but to the action itself; (3)
if the complaint concerns action the agency has taken, pursuant to a
statutory interpretation the petitioner alleges is unconstitutional, the
challenge is to the statute as interpreted and applied by the agency.
Although each of the above instances would involve a different

degree of intrusion into the agency process, each seems to fall within
the criterion authorizing a court to reverse or modify a decision of the

agency that violates constitutional rights. Issues that have been
363
raised include deprivation of property without due process of law,
violation of equal protection, 36 4 or violation of specific provisions of a
particular state constitution. 3 65
In oases of such constitutional challenge, the court is generally
viewed as possessing a plenary power to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency, at least to the extent that factual determinations are not
involved. 866 When factual determinations are involved as a predicate to the resolution of the constitutional issue, a question of the fact/
law distinction may be implicated. This problem is reserved for later
3 67

treatment.

(b) In Excess of Statutory Authority or Jurisdiction
The second criterion for judicial reversal or modification concerns decisions that are "in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency." This statutory formulation has been viewed as a
codification of "long established common law principles."3' 8 Actions
363. See id. at 683, listing condemnation of property without a fair hearing, deprivation of property by prohibiting a lawful use of it or retroactive application of decisions.
Other issues which might arise on these grounds would seem to include an unconstitutional taking without compensation and inadequate notice. This could arise because of
an express statutory provision authorizing the agency action or because the agency interprets the statute to permit the action.
364. Id.
365. Id. n.53.

366. See generally id. at 664-66; DAVIS, TRnA'sn, § 30.01-.14.
367. See text accompanying notes 376-84 infra.
368. 2 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 690. Often when a petitioner complains that
the agency is acting in excess of authority or jurisdiction it will be alleged that such
agency action violates the petitioner's constitutional rights. Id. at 687. In substance
such an allegation is no more than an assertion that one has a constitutional right that
agencies act within their statutory powers or their statutorily prescribed jurisdiction before they can constitutionally affect one's interest. This claim, while perhaps arguably
sound, really risks confusing the real issue, which is one of statutory construction, and
not constitutional interpretation. Moreover it adds nothing since agency action in excess
of authority or jurisdiction will be set aside on judicial review in any event. Id.
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challenged as ultra vires, as beyond geographic 0 9 or subject matter
jurisdiction, 70 as imposing requirements not authorized by statute, 71
as refusing to impose requirements statutorily required, 72 or as not
falling within time limitations prescribed by statute, have been set
aside by courts as being in excess of authority or in excess of jurisdiction.

373

The extent to which the court should substitute its judgment for
the agency's when a statutory authority or jurisdiction issue is raised
may present a problem. As a general rule courts are regarded as possessing power freely to substitute their judgment for that of an agency
when the question is one of statutory interpretation.37 4 This is always involved in resolving authority and jurisdiction issues. But
courts, particularly federal courts, accord "weight," "deference," or
"respect" to many agency determinations that interpret statutes. 876
(c) Made Upon Unlawful Procedure
This provision authorizes a court to reverse or modify agency action that is not in accordance with the procedural requirements specified in the NC APA, or with those required under another statute governing agency procedure. Little need be said on this criterion except to
emphasize that there must exist "substantial rights" that "may have
been prejudiced" by the procedural error.8 76
369. For example, an agency with statewide jurisdiction over corporations operating
in North Carolina attempts to regulate a corporation not operating in the state, or an
agency of the state with geographic jurisdiction limited to specified counties attempts to
act outside those counties.
370. For example, an agency empowered to regulate manufacturers of pesticides attempts to regulate an entity that does not manufacture pesticides.
371. For example, an agency denies a license on a ground not specified in the agency's enabling legislation as a ground for denial.
372. For example, an agency might issue a license without making a finding of fact
that is prerequisite to the issuance of the license.
373. See generally 2 F. CoopaR, supranote 8, at 690-701.
374. See id. at 665; 4 DAVIS, TREATISE §§ 30.01, .14.
375. The classic statement on the subject is contained in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,

323 U.S. 134 (1944):
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their

authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
376. See text accompanying note 362 supra.
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(d) Affected by Errorof Law
This criterion authorizes a court to reverse or modify a decision
that is "affected" by an "error of law." The term "affected" means
that an agency decision is properly subject to reversal or modification
only when an error of law has materially influenced the decision
reached. As such the term appears to be a reverse way of emphasizing the harmless error construction that applies to the entire section.

37 7

The cases provide scant guidance in defining "error of law." Perhaps only an unhelpful conclusion can be stated--"a question of
law" is a matter that the court decides should be subject to plenary
or de novo consideration, with the court being free to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency; "a question of fact" is a matter the
The
court concludes may be subjected to a more restricted review-3s
difficulty apparently inheres in the nature of questions that are raised
in judicial-type proceedings. Such determinations are seldom solely
factual, but often contain elements of both "fact" and "law."879
The supposed "classical dichotomy" between the fact/law distinction in determining scope of review "is of little use as a working
tool '38 0 and has been characterized as "often not an illuminating test"
that is "never self-executing. '3 8 1 One would thus not be surprised that
regards as a question of fact another thinks is a
"[w]hat one judge
882
question of law."
The real explanation of decisions that turn on the question of
whether an administrative determination is one of fact or one of law
appears to involve the courts' conceptions of those issues that the
agency is better qualified to make a judgment upon, and those that a
court is at least equally well-qualified to evaluate. The fact/law dis377. Id.
378. 2 F. CooPR, supra note 8, at 666.
379. Examples abound. The question of whether a person is an employee, a farmer,
a manufacturer or a seller in many cases depends on both the determination of what
the person does (or did) as well as a determination of the "law," i.e. the legal conclusion which follows upon determination of what a person does (or did). The general
problem is by no means limited to scope of review issues. The problem of whether the
question "Was the defendant negligent?" is a question of law or fact has never been
definitively settled. This is so since its resolution involves a determination of both what
the defendant did as well as whether he deviated from a standard of conduct of the "reasonable person."
380. 2 F. Coopin, supra note 8, at 665.
381. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
382. ATroRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 90.
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tinction thus becomes the cutting edge for a policy decision on the allocation of functions between agencies and courts. Accordingly, on issues
that the legislature has created agencies to resolve and when it has provided them with resources to acquire a special competence to evaluate
such issues, the court generally will accord a greater degree of room
to apply such special competence, if, in the particular case, it appears that such special competence is involved in the determination,
and that it was in fact applied. 8
Also other external factors appear to have a direct bearing on the
courts' willingness to permit the agency a wider latitude in decisionmaking under this criterion. These factors, which amount to practical solutions, include the lack of prejudice of the decisionmaker, the experience of the agency, the procedure through which the decision was
derived, the thoroughness of the agency's consideration, the relationship of the agency to the parties who might be affected, and other
largely intangible factors that cause the reviewing court, in a particular case, to have confidence in the agency's determination. 8 4
Perhaps this practical resolution of the problem is satisfactory so
long as it is remembered that what is really at stake is the proper relationship between agencies and courts in the overall scheme of carrying out governmental, and ultimately, the citizens', business.
(e)

Unsupported by SubstantialEvidence

This criterion is concerned with agency decisions in which disputed "adjudicative facts" are determined. "Adjudicative facts" are
facts about the parties. Generally they answer the questions of "who
did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent."383
The practical distinction for purposes of the NC APA will generally
mean that adjudicative facts are those disputed facts that were the
subject of the evidentiary hearing in a contested case proceeding. 86
Under this criterion the court is authorized to reverse or modify an
agency decision involving adjudicative facts if the findings, inferences,
conclusions, or the decision as a whole lacks adequate evidentiary sup383. See generally 4 DAvis, TREAISE, supra note 67, § 30.02, suggesting that the
terms "judicial question" and "administrative question" be substituted for the phrases
"question of law" and "question of fact," respectively.
384. See generally id. § 30.14.

385. 1 id. § 7.02, at 413.
386. Factual determinations in agency proceedings are generally classified either
"adjudicative" or "legislative." See generally id. §§ 7.02, .04.
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port in the entire record that was before the agency or that is submitted to the court by the parties in a judicial review proceeding.
This provision requires the court on judicial review to consider the
evidence appearing in the "whole record" that was admissible under
sections 29(a) and 30, and provides that the court may reverse or
modify only if the court concludes that the decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence.
It can thus be seen that this provision addresses four aspects of
evidence: what is the "kind" of evidence to which the court's consideration is limited (or conversely what may not be considered), what
"quantum" of such evidence must be found, where must such evidence
be found, and what method of evaluating evidence must be employed?
As to the kind of evidence, the court is limited to sustaining a decision on the basis of evidence admissible before the agency under section 29(a) and section 30. Section 29 affirmatively requires exclusion of "irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence." 88 7
As a threshold matter then, if the agency has properly discharged its
function, no such evidence should appear in the record. If the
agency has been remiss in its duty and evidence that should have
been excluded does appear, the court nevertheless is not authorized
to reverse or modify, so long as other evidence of the right kind appears, unless such excludable evidence "may have prejudiced substantial rights" of the petitioner. Conversely, if the only evidence is that
which should have been excluded, the court has no choice but to reverse or modify, since no evidence admissible under section 29 will be
in the record.
Going beyond the mandatory exclusion requirement, determining
the kind of evidence necessary to sustain a decision becomes much
more difficult; however, the NC APA does not require the exclusion of
"incompetent" evidence, as did the predecessor statute.8 88 Nor does
the NC APA, like the predecessor statute, require "competent" evidence
to sustain an agency decision.88 9 It can be reasonably argued, therefore, that the full scale evidentiary limitations governing jury trials are
not applicable on judicial review. It has been suggested that the requirement that "the rules of evidence as applied in the trial division"
387. See text accompanying notes 222-31 supra.
288. See note 227 supra. See generally Hanft, supra note 224.
389. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
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must mean, at an irreducible minimum, that agency decisions must
be based on evidence that a trial judge sitting without a jury would
be entitled to rely upon in reaching a decision, as opposed to entitled
to admit during the course of trial190 Finally it has to be noted that
the Act permits an agency to admit the "most reliable and substantial
evidence available" when evidence under the trial court rules is not
reasonably available.8 91 The problems with this provision have been
noted.

3 92

As with all rules governing receipt of and reliance upon evidence,
the real concern is that only evidence that has some probative value
should affect the decision or sway the mind of the factfinder. Given
this concern, one is tempted to depart the verbal thicket, and announce that when a judge reviews an agency decision with respect to
kind of evidence appearing in the record, the question is, after it is
all said and done, "whether there is in the record at least some probative (as opposed to simply "competent") evidence which can justify
finding the facts found."' 93 Stipulations of fact under section 31(a)
may be considered in making this inquiry.
390. See text accompanying notes 231-35 supra. The real difference between rules
in civil jury trial and in trials without a jury is that a trial judge will not be readily
reversed for the admission of evidence which ought to have been excluded. The rule
is that notwithstanding a failure to exclude evidence that was not properly admissible,
a rebuttable presumption exists that excludable evidence was disregarded. Bizzell v.
Bizzell, 247 N.C. 590, 101 S.E.2d 668, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 888 (1958). See also General Metals, Inc. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 259 N.C. 709, 131 S.E.2d 360 (1963); Chappell
v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963). Although the harmless error rule
should be applied, see text accompanying note 362 supra, it is doubtful that agency decisions as a general matter should be clothed with a similar presumption.
391. Cf. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (1913),
quoting then District Judge Learned Hand, who had been confronted with an offer of
hearsay, not apparently within any exception to the exclusionary requirements for such
proof: "'If this be not evidence I can see no way of getting any better, and the fact
cannot be established at all. Surely the law is not so unreasonable as that.'"
392. See text accompanying notes 235-37 supra.
393. This, the writer thinks, is not a formulation of the "residuum rule." That rule
is intricately tied to an evaluation of evidence that would be admissible in a jury trial.
See generally 2 DAvis, Ta.EAnsp, supra note 67, § 14.10. The NC APA takes two important steps away from that rule: (1) it does not require the exclusion of "incompetent"
evidence, and (2) when evidence admissible under trial court rules is not reasonably
available, it permits admission of the most eliable and substantial evidence available.
See text accompanying notes 222-37 supra. The residuum rule, first announced by the
New York Court of Appeals in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113
N.E. 507 (1916), assumes that only legally "competent" evidence is probative or reliable.
The NC APA, however, makes no such assumption, but recognizes (1) that evidence
which does not satisfy jury trial admissibility rules, depending upon the circumstances,
may be probative and (2) that evidence of a relatively low probative value may nevertheless tend to support a fact when evidence of greater probity is not available. Application
of the residuum rule on judicial review would lead to the anomalous result that an agen-
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A finding that there is in the record some probative evidence to
justify the findings is only the first step, however. The next inquiry is
whether there is a sufficient quantum of such evidence supporting the
findings, in view of other evidence appearing in the record, to make
the findings reasonable. The NC APA provides that the evidence
should be substantial in view of the whole record. Accordingly the
judge must review all the matters that comprise the record39 4 or such
395
parts of the record as the parties by stipulation submit.
With respect to evaluation of the record to determine whether
the evidence is substantial, it is clear that the court may not substitute
its judgment for the agency's, but must limit itself to the "reasonableness" of the administrative findings by weighing all the evidence.3 96
The substantial evidence rule has been criticized as being unworkable, with courts being better able to understand and apply the
"clear error" standard, 397 which is applied by appellate courts on review of trial court findings.398 But Justice Frankfurter appears to
have been right in his classic statement: "[Tlhe precise way in which
courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any
form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not
likely to be more helpful than the old. There are no talismanic words
that can avoid the process of judgment."399
However, some guides to the exercise of judgment can be found.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the reviewing court
exceeds its scope of review when it finds additional facts the agency had
been requested to find but refused, when in so doing the court substituted its evaluation of the evidence for that of the agency.4"' This
means that an agency decision that is reasonable from the standpoint of
cy's decision would be reversed, without looking at the reasonableness of the decision
in view of all evidence in the record, but merely because the agency had admitted and
based findings upon evidence that did not meet jury trial rules (which, of course, it was
authorized to do under section 29!). Accordingly, the kind of evidence inquiry under
the NC APA is simply a threshold inquiry that will permit reversal where no probative
or reliable evidence supports a decision. Such a decision would have to be unreasonable,
without regard to the whole record standard of review, since there would be in the record
no evidence tending to support a finding of fact.
394. For a discussion of the content of the record see note 272 and accompanying
text supra.
395. See text accompanying notes 348-50 supra.
396. 4 DAvis, TREATSE, supra note 67, § 29.01, at 115.
397. 2 F. CooPER, supra note 8, at 724-29.
398. Id. at 726.
399. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (emphasis
added).
400. Clark Equip. Co. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 269, 134 S.E.2d 327 (1964).
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the evidence cannot be reversed under the substantial evidence criterion,
although the court might have found differently if it were evaluating the
evidence as an initial matter. Similarly the North Carolina Supreme
Court has recently reiterated that substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence as a401reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
Putting the requirements of right kind, substantial evidence, and
whole record together can perhaps best be done by illustration. In the
course of a proceeding the existence or the nonexistence of fact X
must be found by the agency. Witness A, who has no first hand knowlledge of fact X, is offered to testify about what B said to witness A
regarding fact X. Plainly witness A's testimony is hearsay, but, depending on the circumstances, witness A may be permitted to testify
to B's statement either because A's testimony falls within one of exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary rule or because B is out of the
country or dead, and thus not "reasonably available." For purposes
of admission before the agency, depending upon the circumstances,
A's testimony may be admissible as the right kind of evidence if it possesses some probative worth.
Suppose further that B's statement tends to support the existence
of fact X. During the course of the proceeding witness C is produced who testifies that he bribed B to induce B to make the statement
to A. C produces his cancelled check payable to B as well as B's
letter thanking C for the payment and asserting that the statement
requested has been made to A. The agency finds the existence of
fact X, crediting A's testimony but none of C's.
On judicial review if one looks only at the part of the record
containing A's testimony the agency decision is much more likely to appear to be supported by substantial evidence, than it appears when
Cs testimony is looked at as well. Furthermore, in other parts of
the record suppose there is testimony authenticating B's letter, as well
as C's cancelled check. Upon weighing all the evidence the agency's
finding of the existence of fact X begins to appear unreasonable.
Suppose further, however, that in still other parts of the record
there is found testimony of witness D, a psychiatrist, to the effect that
C is a pathological liar, 40 2 and E, a handwriting expert, that C is a
401. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 471, 202 &E.2d
129, 137 (1974), quoting Hanft, supra note 224, at 667.
402. This tends to explain why C might make the assertions.
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master forger, 40 8 and F, a banker, that B paid part of the note he cosigned at the bank for C.40 4 The agency's finding of the existence
of fact X now begins again to appear reasonable.

(f) Arbitrary and Capricious
The criterion "arbitrary and capricious" when applied to contested cases seems to function as a catchall. Frequently it operates to
mask the real reason the court deems intrusion into the administrative
process to be warranted. As such, it tends to encourage the absence
of careful reasoning by the courts. Moreover, it appears that most
cases that properly may be reversed or modified as "arbitrary or capricious" will fall under one of the more discrete citeria discussed
above. 40 5 Courts reviewing contested cases should use this criterion
only in those rare instances in which reversal or modification is necessary because substantial rights may have been prejudiced, but cannot
be justified under the more specific and discrete criteria authorizing
judicial intrusion.
In the case of rulemaking under the NC APA, however, the arbitrary and capricious standard seems to hold the best prospect of accommodating the need for agency flexibility and the purposes of judi4 a
cial review. 0
It will be recalled that rulemaking under the Act is not subject to
the provisions governing contested cases, unless rule adoption by adjudicatory procedures is required by an organic statute.4 °7 A major impact of the exemption of rulemaking from the procedural requirements
governing contested cases is to eliminate a necessity for trial-type proceedings. This may mean, for example, that the "record" of rulemaking proceedings may not contain the characteristic evidence and
testimonial transcript. It thus becomes very difficult for courts imbued with a familiarity with trial court record review to understand
the meaning of a "substantial evidence" test and its application to
rulemaking 40 8 without at least a risk that the judicial review standard
403. This tends to explain why the letter could have been authenticated as B's.
404. This tends to provide an explanation of C's payment to B on grounds other
than bribery.
405. E.g., cases not supported by substantial evidence, or in excess of statutory authority can be broadly described as arbitrary and capricious.
406. See generally Verkuil, supranote 53, at 230.
407. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
408. The federal courts have tackled this problem without a uniform outcome or
notable clarity. See Verkuil, supra note 53, at 230-34.
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will restrict agency rulemaking to a decisional model that is required
of adjudication. If this were to occur the reasons for distinguishing
between rulemaking and adjudication at the agency level would be
lost.
In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, however,
courts can achieve the purposes judicial review serves without restricting agency rulemaking procedures. The ultimate purpose of
rulemaking review is to insure "reasoned decisionmaking" by requiring agencies to "articulate with reasonable clarity . . . reasons for

decision, and identify the significance of crucial facts.'10° If the
agency does not state reasons that adequately reveal the basis of its
action the court may remand for a "concise statement." If the statement in view of the "record" reveals that the decision is "arbitrary
or capricious" it may be reversed or modified.410
Finally, it should be recalled that apart from review of an
agency's denial of a petition to adopt, amend, or repeal a rule (which
is limited to the issue of whether the denial constitutes an abuse of
discretion), judicial review of rulemaking can occur only in connection with the declaratory ruling mechanism. 411 Accordingly, it will be
relatively easy to identify and therefore distinguish between rulemaking review and contested case review.
409. Id. at 230. Other procedures before the agency in rulemaking proceedings do
not present problems created in analyzing the Federal APA, because the NC APA contains specific requirements governing other aspects of rulemaking. See text accompanying notes 69-170 supra.
410. Unfortunately, courts in applying the "arbitrary or capricious" test have not
articulated clearly either those precise factors which cause them to characterize the action as condemnable, nor have they drawn clear distinctions between action that is "arbitrary" and that which is "capricious." See generally 2 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at
756-72. However, it has been stated as a general rule that courts, even in the absence
of statute, have power to review administrative action under this criterion. Id. at 258.
Thus the statutory criterion represents to some extent a codification of common law judicial review doctrine. Agency decisions have been regarded as arbitrary or capricious
inter alia when such decisions are "whimsical" because they indicate a lack of fair and
careful consideration; give different treatment to parties in identical circumstances; dem.
onstrate an irrational unfairness which suggests malice or discrimination; fail to indicate
"any course of reasoning and the exercise of judgment," Board of Educ. v. Phillips, 264
Ala. 603, 89 So. 2d 96 (1956); are based upon factors unrelated to statutory purposes;
impose or omit procedural requirements that result in manifest unfairness in the circumstances though within the letter of statutory requirements; or amount to a wilful disregard of statutory purposes. 2 F. CoOmRm, supra note 8, at 761-69 and cases cited therein.
Although most of the cases cited arose in contexts other than rulemaking, the basic legal
standard should be applicable.
411. See text accompanying notes 317-21 supra.
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CONCLUSION

In implementing the NC APA, problems assuredly will be encountered. Events may prove some of the provisions to be unworkable,
thus necessitating various amendments. 4 12 Neither the drafters nor
this writer could anticipate all problems that the wide variety of agencies will experience, and foresee all the problems that will be posed
for the State's changing instruments for carrying out the people's business-administrative agencies. The NC APA, however, does represent
a bold step in the direction of both fair and efficient government and
ought to be given a fair chance to prove its worth.
412. This should not be surprising. Issues under the Federal APA remain unsettled
after nearly three decades.

